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HIV Home Testing and the FDA: The




In the late 1980s the FDA adopted a de facto blanket ban on
human immuno-deficiency virus (HIV) home-testing kits.1 Under the
ban, the agency has declined, as a matter of policy,2 to approve
premarketing applications for HIV home-testing products.3 The ban
gained public attention in the 1990s, as a number of companies ap-
plied for FDA premarketing approval of HIV home-testing kits de-
spite the agency's unequivocal position.4 In 1994 an FDA advisory
panel5 (1994 Panel) held hearings to reassess the agency's position on
IV diagnostics.6 The 1994 Panel was established in response to man-
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1. For the sake of brevity, I shall occasionally use the phrase "home testing" as short-
hand for home testing for HIV. I shall refer to the kits for home testing of HIV as "home-
testing kits."
2. See infra note 17. Despite its clear and consistent position against HIV home-
testing products through early 1994, FDA spokespersons have occasionally suggested that
no categorical FDA position exists in regard to the products. See, ag., Rebecca Kolberg,
FDA Urges Caution on Home AIDS Tests, UPI, Mar. 23, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, WIRES File (citing such testimony by then-FDA Commissioner Frank Young).
3. Home-testing products have been approved for marketing and are currently mar-
keted for numerous other purposes, including the provision of information regarding preg-
nancy, blood pressure, asthma, urinary disorders, diabetes, and cholesterol. For a brief
discussion of the nature and function of several of these products, see Jane B. Clark, Home
Test Kits: Welcome to the Modem Medicine Cabinet, KIPLINGER'S PERS. FIN. MAG., Nov.
1992, at 112.
4. See infra note 18 and accompanying text.
5. FDA "advisory panels" are the first level at which premarketing applications for
medical devices are scrutinized. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA")
§515 (c)(2), 21 U.S.C. §360e(c)(2) (1983 & Supp. V 1993).
6. A technical distinction is sometimes made between "blood collection test kits"
and "home test kits." When this distinction is made, blood collection kits refer to kits that
require the user to send the blood they collect to a laboratory for analysis; home test kits
refer to kits that permit the user to take the sample and to perform the test at home. See
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ufacturer and consumer interest in HIV home-testing products, as
well as to rising public interest in stemming the tide of new AIDS
cases.
7
The 1994 Panel has recommended a cautious FDA retreat8 from
the blanket policy that currently disfavors HIV home-testing kits as a
class.9 While the 1994 Panel's assessment does not expressly or tacitly
support any particular home-testing product, it does suggest that the
FDA should become receptive to the concept of home testing for
HIV.10 If the blanket ban were dropped, home-testing products
would be assessed individually for safety and effectiveness and evalu-
ated for approval based on their own particular merits and flaws.
The 1994 Panel's recommendations are not dispositive; rather,
they will be considered by the Commissioner of the FDA when he
determines future policy direction regarding the treatment of forth-
coming applications for approval of home-testing products. More-
over, opinions of members of the 1994 Panel varied, and the
recommendations were neither unanimous nor entirely unambigu-
ous." Whereas some members favored immediate FDA receptive-
ness to HIV home-testing kits, others recommended proceeding
cautiously, and a minority of the Panel members opposed a significant
change in existing policy. 12 However, because the FDA adopts most
advisory panel recommendations, 3 it is likely that the agency will
eventually consider HIV home test products on a case-by-case basis.
Stuart L. Nightingale, FDA Position on Blood Collection Test Kits for AIDS, 259 JAMA
3231 (1988).
For the purposes of this Article, both blood collection test kits and home test kits will
be included under the broad rubric of "home testing." Because FDA policy has categori-
cally rejected all HIV home-testing approaches, the comments in this Article refer to both
collection and testing. When it is necessary to distinguish the two technical forms, I shall
do so by explaining the structural and functional differences involved rather than by using
shorthand expressions that may be confusing.
7. For a discussion of the rising rates of infection and disease, see Anne Rochell,
AIDS Deaths in U.S. Top 200,000. Next 14 Months to Claim at Least 130,000 More, ATL.
CONST., Oct. 29, 1993, at Al; Richard M. Selik et al., HIV Infection as Leading Cause of
Death Among Young Adults in U.S. Cities and States, 269 JAMA 2991 (1993); AIDS Is Top
Killer Among Young Men, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 31, 1993, at 19.
8. For more detailed discussion of the 1994 Panel's observations, see infra notes 43-
45 and accompanying text.
9. See Laurie Garrett, Panel Asks OK on Home AIDS Test, NEWSDAY (Nassau-Suf-
folk ed.) June 23, 1994, at A7.
10. Id.




This Article contains a comprehensive analysis of both the practi-
cal and philosophical issues concerning HIV home-testing approval.
Section I provides a brief history and background of the issues related
to HIV home testing. Section II contains a discussion of the argu-
ments that have been made against home testing, and Section III pro-
vides the arguments in favor of home testing. In each of these
Sections, particular arguments are discussed in separate Subsections,
and the strength of each argument is evaluated. In Section IV, the
assessments made in Sections II and III are brought together in the
form of some basic theoretical and philosophical tenets regarding the
nature and extent of FDA authority and discretion in a free society.
The central themes of this Article can be summarized briefly:
(A) Even under the most paternalistic scrutiny, HIV home-testing
products that are what I designate "primarily" or "immediately" safe
and effective 14 are desirable, and they have been desirable at least
since the blanket ban was instituted by the FDA in the late 1980s.
These products are desirable because their costs have been largely ex-
aggerated or misunderstood and because their purported benefits are
both substantial and crucial. Accordingly, even if the FDA continues
to interpret its premarketing approval discretion broadly, HIV home-
testing products that meet traditional safety and effectiveness stan-
dards should be approved for marketing. My analysis of the weak-
nesses of arguments critical of home testing and the strengths of
arguments favoring home testing is meant to provide a comprehensive
catalogue and evaluation of the issues relevant to the HIV home-test-
ing controversy. The results of this analysis suggest that unless the
factors discussed change substantially, even the most overreaching
FDA should support the concept of home testing for HIV.
(B) It was never advisable for the FDA to develop a blanket policy
rejecting home-testing products on the basis of considerations other
14. For the purposes of this Article, the term "primary" is used to denote immediate
safety or effectiveness, whereas "secondary" denotes consequential safety or effectiveness.
A product is immediately or primarily safe if, properly used, it is not the proximate cause
of an unacceptable level of harm to the user. An intervening, superseding cause of harm,
such as the user's traumatic response to the product, is a secondary or consequential threat
to safety. Such secondary causes do not indicate a product that is inherently unsafe; rather,
they suggest a safe product to which people may react rashly. According to the analysis
developed in Section V, such products themselves should not be deemed unsafe.
Likewise, a product is immediately or primarily effective if it achieves some threshold
level of healthful results when properly used. In comparison, secondary or consequential
sources of product ineffectiveness are a function of product misuse. These secondary
causes do not suggest that a product does not work; rather, they reflect user failure to
follow instructions.
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than the primary safety and effectiveness of these products. The FDA
should refrain from exercising its discretion too broadly. Regardless
of the latitude conferred upon administrative agencies in the imple-
mentation of their missions, 15 the FDA should restrict its authority
strictly to the assessment of primary product safety and effectiveness.
In other words, even though HIV home-testing products can with-
stand scrutiny that permits paternalistic protection of consumers
against their own particular follies or vulnerabilities, they should not
be subjected to such scrutiny. The blanket ban on HIV home-testing
products of the past five years was a policy error, and that error would
not have been made if the FDA had left considerations apart from
basic product safety and effectiveness to individual consumer
discretion.
(C) Given the tenor of the 1994 Panel's proceedings, the FDA will
probably eventually assess new device applications individually. In
such a case-by-case consideration of premarketing approval applica-
tions, the FDA should decline to assess secondary safety and effective-
ness considerations, such as the ability of consumers to process the
information obtained from the product without experiencing psycho-
logical trauma. While the 1994 Panel is the first FDA panel to demon-
strate broad support for the concept of HIV home testing, individual
products themselves will still be subject to case-by-case evaluation
should the blanket ban be lifted. In assessing individual products, the
FDA will identify, explicitly or implicitly, appropriate evaluation crite-
ria. In accordance with the spirit of restraint proposed throughout
this Article, the FDA should carefully circumscribe the scope of these
criteria. While it might be acceptable for the FDA to require manu-
facturers to provide reasonable safeguards to buffer consumers
against psychological trauma, the agency should not evoke overly pro-
tective motives that stall the market entry of vital home-testing
products.
15. Under the Administrative Procedures Act, agency actions are reviewed under an
abuse of discretion standard. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1989). Agencies have been accorded
substantial latitude under this standard. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 525 (1978). For a concise discussion of
administrative agency discretion, see Elizabeth A. Silverberg, Looking Beyond Judicial
Deference to Agency Discretion: A Fundamental Right of Access to RU 486?, 59 BROOK. L.
REv. 1551, 1567-69 (1994).
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L History and Background,
In 1986 and 1987 the FDA considered the applications of several
manufacturers that had developed HIV tests for home usage.16 The
FDA decided in 1988 to limit its approval to the marketing of HIV
.blood collection kits intended solely for professional use.17 Among
the FDA's stipulated criteria for marketable HIV-testing kits under
this policy is a requirement that "[k]its are labeled and marketed for
professional use only within a health care environment (e.g., hospitals,
medical clinics, doctor's offices, sexually transmitted disease clinics,
HIV-1 counseling and testing centers, and mental health clinics)."18
According to FDA spokesperson Brad Stone, FDA refusal to consider
applications of HIV home tests was based on several concerns, includ-
ing the potentially improper drawing of blood samples, the possibility
of blood samples being held for long periods of time, and the potential
for blood samples to be affected by temperature changes during in-
mail transit.' 9
In 1989 and 1990 the FDA reconsidered its stance against 1IV
home-testing kits pursuant to pressures exerted by University Hospi-
tal Laboratories Corp. of Bethesda, Maryland (UHL).20 At the time,
many influential individuals and organizations expressed aversion to
the approval of such products.2' An advisory panel created to evalu-
ate UHL's product and to reassess the FDA's position on H[V home-
16. The manufacturers of these products submitted them for FDA approval under the
provisions of the FDCA that grant the FDA premarket approval authority over Class III
medical devices. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e (1983 & Supp. V 1993).
17. 54 Fed. Reg. 7279, 7280 (1989).
18. Id.
19. FDA to Consider Applications for HIV Home Test Kits, 5 AIDS ALERT 119
(1990).
20. UHL sued the FDA in federal district court in early 1990, seeking a court order
requiring the agency to review its premarketing application. The suit alleged that the FDA
had declined to review a December 1987 application under its 1988 policy decision to re-
view only applications for HIV test kits designed for professional administration. Mike
Folks, AIDS-Test Maker Sues U.S. Agencies, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1990, at B4. UHL's
action was dismissed, and the FDA agreed to review several HIV home test applications.
FDA Considers Home AIDS Test, UPI, Apr. 25, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
WIRES File.
21. Those who expressed concern regarding the benefit of HV home testing during
this period include Stephen Bowen of the Centers for Disease Control, the National Insti-
tutes of Health, the American College of Pathology, the New Jersey Department of
Health, Edelman Health Center, FDA Commissioner Frank Young, and Congressman Ron
Wyden (D-Ore). Drug. Res. Rep. (Pub. Health Sec.), Home AIDS Testing Would be Inap-
propriate Public Health Practice CDC Official Tells FDA Hearing, 32 BLUE SHEET No. 15,
Apr. 12, 1989, at 9-10.
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testing kits (1990 Panel) voted 3-1 to reject UHL's home test.2 The
1990 Panel expressed concerns regarding the ability of nonprofession-
als to take their own blood samples safely and efficiently. A represen-
tative of the FDA's Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research
expressed the additional concern that UHL's product application had
"'major deficiencies' and lacked 'critical details' on how the labora-
tory and counseling systems would work in support of a home testing
product."2 3 Moreover, this representative stated that UHL's clinical
trials were "'inadequate in design and size,"' 24 and that UHL "'failed
to support specific claims that [the product] would increase the use of
testing by persons at increased AIDS risk who may be unwilling or
unable to be tested in the current system.' '2 5 Although the FDA had
suggested in April of 1990 that it would consider applications of home
test products, 26 the 1988 criteria limiting HIV-testing kits to "profes-
sional use" were ultimately reaffirmed in 1990.27 Despite the FDA's
categorical disapproval of home testing through 1993 and into 1994,
bootleg HIV home-testing kits have been sold and even advertised for
brief periods in the United States, with sales terminating abruptly as
the illegal schemes have been brought to the attention of the FDA.28
In 1992 Health Test, the developer of an HIV home-testing prod-
uct called "HIV Home Check," submitted an application to the Cali-
fornia Department of Health Services29 for approval to market its
22. Rebecca Kolberg, FDA Panel Blocks Home AIDS Test, UPI Domestic News, July
19, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES File.
23. Id.
24. Id. The trial sample consisted of 170 persons. The FDA recommended the execu-
tion of additional trials using about 3,100 subjects. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 55 Fed. Reg. 30,982-83 (1990).
28. For example, an ad appearing in "Creative Loafing" in late 1993 marketed a
"Home AIDS Test Kit" for $28.95, claiming the kit to be 99.5% accurate, and asserting
that the test had been tested by the Centers for Disease Control and other highly regarded
institutions and developed in a "U.S.F.D.A. approved laboratory." Marketing of the prod-
uct ceased shortly after FDA investigation. Kevin Washington, Illegal "Home AIDS Test"
Investigated, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 30, 1993, at lB.
29. The California Department of Health Services was particularly concerned about
the self-administration aspect of the test. Therefore, while Health Test originally conceived
a $24.95 test for self-administration in the home, the product it eventually advertised on
cable television was a $44.95 kit that required the intervention of a lab technician whom
Health Test intended to send to the home to take the blood sample. Anne Michaud, Home
HIV Test Altered Is Under State Pressure, L.A. TIMES (Orange County ed.), Mar. 26, 1992,
at D1.
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product 30 prior to in-state marketing.31 Health Test found the process
slow and cumbersome-the company amended its application eight
times during a 21-month period and repeatedly did not receive either
an approval or a denial.3 2 When the company sued the California De-
partment of Health Services, it won an injunction requiring state.
health officials to render an expedient decision. 3 While Health Test's
product did not evoke a nationwide voicing of varying policy opinions,
critics of home testing emerged, most notably among AIDS-related
facility administrators, public health officials,35 and pharmacists.3 6
30. The Medical Device Amendments bring into question the future role of state au-
thority in the monitoring and control of medical devices. Cf. Green v. Dolsky, 641 A.2d
600 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (holding state law tort claims concerning medical devices pre-
empted by Medical Device Amendments). The portion of the Medical Device Amend-
ments that preempts state regulation states that unless exempted under express provisions
of the Amendments, "no state or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue
in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement (1) which is
different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this chapter to the
device, and (2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other
matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this chapter. 21 U.S.C.
§ 360k. Under an FDA regulation implementing this preemption policy, preemption ap-
plies to state requirements "having the force and effect of law (whether established by
statute, ordinance, regulation or court decision)," but "only when the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration has established specific counterpart regulations or there are other specific re-
quirements applicable to a particular device under the act[.]" 21 C.F.R. §§ 808.1(b),
808.1(d) (1994).
31. Health Test, which limited its initial marketing and sales efforts to the state of
California, later planned to seek FDA approval. Company Selling In-Home AIDS Testing,
UPI, Mar. 26, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES File. At the time Health
Test began marketing its product, the company president, Steve Coonan, was cited as say-
ing that the product fell outside FDA approval jurisdiction because the tests were to be
processed in a laboratory rather than at home. Anne Michaud, Costa Mesa Firm Says It
Will Market Home AIDS Test, L.A. TIMES (Orange County ed.), Mar. 25, 1992, at D5, D6.
The FDA disagreed and objected to the marketing of HIV Home Check prior to receipt of
FDA approval. Id. Coonan's Coonan Clinical Laboratories is one of the companies pres-
ently seeking FDA approval of HIV home-testing products for national distribution. Or-
ange County Briefly, L.A. TImEs (Orange County ed.), July 6, 1994, at D6.
32. James M. Gomez, Maker of HIV Test Kit Sues for State's OK, L.A. TiMES, Sept.
28, 1993, at D2.
33. James M. Gomez, Judge Orders Showdown on HIV Home-Test Kit, L.A. Tiimras
(Orange County ed.), Oct. 20, 1993, at D8.
34. See Michaud, supra note 31, at D6 (citing criticisms of HIV home testing ex-
pressed by the director of the AIDS Response Program in Garden Grove, California).
35. Id. (citing concerns regarding HIV home testing expressed by an official of the
Orange County Department of Public Health).
36. See Fred Gebhart, California Association Supports Home HIV Test Limits, 135
DRUG Topics, No. 5, Mar. 11, 1991, at 10 (reporting a vote of the California Pharmacists
Association supporting the restriction of IV test kits to professionals trained in health
care).
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Beginning in 1992, several manufacturers of HIV home testing
products initiated discussions with the FDA, once again requesting the
agency to reevaluate its blanket policy stance and consider the individ-
ual merits of various HIV home test products.37 In their present form,
the proposed test kits would provide the consumer with skin-pricking
devices and laboratory blotting paper for the deposit of a drop of
blood to be taken from the finger.38 The consumer would send the lab
paper with its sample, which would be identified by a code number, to
a designated address for analysis. The lab result would then be re-
trieved by telephone after several days.39 Specific processes for com-
municating results and for providing counseling services vary among
sponsors and their products, but tape-recorded messages would gener-
ally be given only to those whose test results are negative.40 Those
who test positive would be informed of their status by a live person
over the telephone, who would then direct the consumer to some kind
of telephone counseling service.
41
37. These companies include Direct Access Diagnostics (a Johnson & Johnson unit),
Coonan Clinical Laboratories, and Anonymous Test Services. FDA Panel to Weigh HIV
Home Testing Issues, Bus. REP., June 21, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES
File [hereinafter Home Testing Issues].
38. Other kinds of HIV test kits have been developed as well, such as saliva tests
employing a "dipstick" that changes color in five minutes to indicate exposure to the virus.
The saliva test was prepared for test marketing in Singapore in 1992 by the University of
Florida, which holds the product's patent. According to Professor Clemons, the University
of Florida professor who developed the product, the FDA expressed interest in observing
test performance over 5,000 cases, including pregnant people and those who have various
disorders that might affect accuracy of results. Delthia Ricks, Home Test for AIDS on the
Way; Foreign Sales of the Kit, Pioneered by a University of Florida Researcher, Will Begin in
a Few Weeks, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., May 29, 1992, at Al.
39. Companies are investigating the possibility of developing a product capable of
yielding in-home results similar to the results available with in-home pregnancy products
that are currently mass-marketed. Lois Rogers, Home Truths, THm TIMES, Apr. 10, 1994,
(Features), at 11. The products presently proposed do not contain this kind of self-diagno-
sis technology. Because the most frequent criticism of in-home testing products concerns
the unavailability of pre- and post-test counseling services, critics are likely to object even
more strenuously to any future products that contain a self-diagnosis method, permitting
the consumer to by-pass all professional contact subsequent to purchasing the product. In
theory, the HIV test that requires the consumer to call a centralized professional to receive
test results can at least provide all those tested with unavoidable contact and access to
counseling that is inextricably tied to receipt of results.
40. See Joanne Jacobs, A Shift Away from Professionals: Home AIDS Test Would be a
First Step in Empowering Health Consumers, ATL. CONsT., Jul. 20, 1994, at A12 (describing
the manner in which consumers would be notified of HIV home-test results).
41. Id.
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By mid-1994, three of the companies that had developed HIV
home-testing products applied for premarketing approval,42 implicitly
requesting that the FDA reconsider its categorical rejection of HIV
home testing four years earlier. The FDA reopened the issue, em-
ploying the same process it used in 1990-an advisory panel was once
again established to consider the advantages and disadvantages of
HIV home-testing products. Like the 1990 Panel, the 1994 Panel's
function was to make recommendations to the FDA based on its find-
ings. The 1994 Panel was more receptive than the 1990 Panel to the
idea of HIV home testing. While opinions of the 1994 Panel members
varied, some suggested that the FDA reconsider its categorical rejec-
tion of HIV home-testing products and evaluate each product individ-
ually to determine its safety and effectiveness.43 Some members of
the 1994 Panel recommended the employment of pilot studies that
would assess the effects of HIV home test products on public health
issues, such as "user demographics, whether at-risk groups [are] ...
using the test, changes in the counseling component of the test, con-
trol of biohazards, instances of coercive use or other misuse of the
test, user comprehension of test materials, the psychological impact of
receiving HIV results in the home, and the adequacy of the phone
counseling component." 44 Some staff members of the FDA's Center
for Biologics Evaluation and Research expressed confusion over
whether 1994 Panel members were recommending premarketing or
postmarketing pilot studies;45 in the former event, approval of the first
HIV home test product may be years away, even should the FDA be-
come receptive to such products in theory. While change appears to
be forthcoming, the FDA's consideration of many of the issues raised
in Sections H and IH may delay the marketing of safe and effective
HIV home-testing products that have lifesaving potential.
42. Ellen Shubart, An Upstart Gets Tested" HIV Exam Firm Seeks Federal Approval,
CRAINS CHICAGO BusrNEss, Aug. 8 1994, at 31. See also supra note 37 (identifying the
three companies in question).
43. Home-Use HIV Sample Collection System Pilot Studies Recommended, 20 GRAY
SHEET No. 26, June 27, 1994, at 6-9 [hereinafter Pilot Studies Recommended].
44. Id.
45. Id.
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II. Arguments Against Home Testing
A. Home Testing May Confuse Patients if the Tests Are Difficult to
Administer or the Results Yielded Are Difficult to
Understand46
Generally, society needs medical professionals, including physi-
cians, nurses, pharmacists, and laboratory technicians, because pa-
tients are often unable to diagnose or treat themselves. Nonetheless,
patients often care for themselves when diagnosis and treatment are
uncomplicated and accessible to laypersons.47 The concern that HIV
testing may be so complex as to be dangerous or ineffective if placed
beyond the control of health care professionals is therefore a legiti-
mate one.48 On the other hand, if home-testing products can be de-
veloped for sufficiently easy, safe, and effective self-administration,
then the objection must fall.
Assume for the moment that some HIV home-testing products
that have been or may be developed are in fact so complex to adminis-
ter or interpret as to render approval of those products unadvisable.
This assumption in itself is inadequate as a justification for a blanket
rejection of all HIV home-testing products. It is inadequate in theory
because someone may always develop a different product that is not
too complex for self-administration and -interpretation, and it is inad-
equate in reality because many of the wide variety of home test prod-
ucts are not complex to administer and interpret, at least according to
manufacturer claims.
49
Specifically, prospective sponsors of HIV home-testing devices
have developed products that ostensibly yield diagnoses from samples
of saliva, urine, and blood. Saliva tests, some of which have been
46. See Rogers, supra note 39 (citing as ethical concerns regarding HIV home testing
"whether the public can be trusted to take responsibility for assessing their own health,
whether they will understand the results thrown up by the tests, and whether they will be
able to deal with the consequences .... ).
47. For example, self-treatment of asthma is common and has been the subject of
scholarly investigation. See, e.g., William C. Bailey et al., A Randomized Trial to Improve
Self-Management Practices of Adults with Asthma, 150 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 1664 (Aug.
1990).
48. For a discussion of pre-analytic, analytic, and post-analytic variables pertaining,
inter alia, to the accuracy of HIV testing and that may be used to argue in favor of profes-
sional administration of all aspects of testing, see D.J. Bylund et al., Review of Testing for
Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 12 CLIN. LAB. MED. 305 (1992).
49. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
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shown to be highly reliable,50 employ a dipstick evaluation5' and obvi-
ously entail no bodily invasion by needle or skinprick. Urine tests are
analogouss2 and no more complicated to use than home pregnancy
tests that use urine samples. Even the blood tests presently at issue
are simple and straightforward to administer,5 3 according to manufac-
turer claims.
It bears emphasizing here that all three types of tests should be
assessed by the FDA for primary safety and effectiveness. Nonethe-
less, if manufacturer claims regarding these products prove accurate,
objections based on consumer inability to use the products properly
are untenable.5
B. Home Testing May Be Ineffective or Unsafe, or Less Effective and
Less Safe than On-Site Testing
Two related arguments can be made regarding the safety and ef-
fectiveness of any home-testing product-that it is unacceptably inef-
fective or unsafe in absolute terms, and that it is less effective or safe
than products developed and marketed for professional, on-site ad-
50. For a study of HIV saliva test reliability, see A.J. Hunt et al., The Testing of Saliva
Samples for HIV-1 Antibodies: Reliability in a Non-Clinic Setting, 69 GENtrrouRINARY
MED. 29 (1993).
51. Virotechnology, Inc. has developed a saliva home test kit with which "a consumer
would perform the saliva test in 10 minutes at home, but the result-such as a blue dot or a
red triangle-could only be decoded by calling a toll-free number. A trained employee
would tell the caller that the test was either negative or 'inconclusive."' See Susan Okie,
FDA Hears Arguments over AIDS Home Tests: Companies Develop Kits that Analyze Sa-
liva, WASH. PosT, Apr. 7, 1989, at A3. The furtive handling of information under such a
scheme-including the use of code results and the absence of "positive" result terms-is
indicative of the extent to which the FDA and commentators have treated persons tested
with arguably excessive caution.
Saliva tests have also been proposed for on-site use by hospitals, emergency techni-
cians, and physicians, as a means of HIV analysis that avoids the drawing of blood and any
attendant risk of infection by needle accidents. See Marc McFarland, FDA Approval
Sought for More Tests on AIDS-Detection Kit, UPI, Apr. 11, 1989, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, WIRES File.
52. See Calypte Biomedical Announces Development of Urine Test for HIV, BUS.
WIRE, May 9, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES File (quoting Howard
Urnovitz, founder and president of Calypte, "Urine is easily obtainable by non-invasive
techniques. For home usage, inexperienced individuals won't have to draw their own
blood....").
53. See supra text accompanying notes 38 and 39. The skinprick blood sample is tech-
nologically unsophisticated, in fact employing the same technique used by this author and
millions of others in junior high school biology to perform self blood-type testing.
54. Of course, such products should be subject to individual evaluation for basic
safety and effectiveness, under the standards I outline in Section V.
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ministration. These two types of arguments will be addressed individ-
ually in this Subsection.
(1) Thq Argument that HIV Home-Testing Products Are Ineffective or
Unsafe in Absolute Terms
Contentions of basic ineffectiveness or lack of safety of any medi-
cal device, be it for home use or professional use, cut to the core of the
legislation that mandates and empowers the FDA to monitor such
products both before and after marketing.55 Unquestionably, the
FDA has both the right and the obligation to reject premarketing ap-
plications for any HIV home-testing product that does not meet the
standards to which medical devices in general are ordinarily held.
During the panel hearings of the late 1980s for the assessment of HIV
home-testing products, then-FDA Commissioner Frank Young noted
in this regard that the marketing of home test kits must be predicated
on findings that they are reliable, safe, and not misleading.5 6
These criteria are the classic criteria of FDA scrutiny, reflecting
the nation's reliance on that agency to ensure product safety and ef-
fectiveness, 57 as well as product purity and accuracy of product label-
ing.58 While all HIV home test products that are substandard for
these traditional reasons should be denied premarketing approval,
only substandard products should be denied premarketing approval.
Unfortunately, in its historic rejection of the entire class of HIV
home test products, the FDA has suggested a reliance on considera-
tions other than these basic criteria. By establishing guidelines that
limited premarketing approval exclusively to professionally adminis-
tered, on-site products,59 the agency refused to consider the poten-
tially high levels of primary safety and effectiveness of at-home
alternatives. In other words, the contentions that a product is unsafe,
ineffective, mislabelled, or deceptively packaged are the only conten-
tions in this Section that provide legitimate bases for the rejection of
any home test product. Yet in its past practice of categorical disap-
proval, the FDA has refused to permit individual companies to prove
the quality of products along these crucial dimensions. This failure to
assess products along essential dimensions on the basis of individual
55. See infra notes 171-194.
56. See Rebecca Kohlberg, FDA Urges Caution on Home AIDS Tests, UPI, Mar. 24,
1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES File.
57. See infra note 185.
58. See infra note 160.
59. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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merits suggests that unsafety and ineffectiveness are-spurious motives
for disqualification.
(2) The Argument that HIV Home-Testing Products Are Less Effective or
Safe than Products Developed for Professional, On-Site
Administration
While both the relative safety and effectiveness of products for
home use are potential issues relevant to their ultimate approval or
disapproval, the arguments of critics have focused on their purported
ineffectiveness rather than lack of safety. Ostensibly lower reliability
may be a function of one or more or the following phenomena: (a)
Inaccurate results may be found to stem from factors difficult or im-
possible to control, such as how long a kit or blood sample has been in
a mailbox and the temperatures to which samples are exposed, partic-
ularly in transit;60 (b) Home test kits that have been on the counter for
a sufficient length of time may not contain the technology to register
infection via the latest viral mutations,61 , increasing the potential inci-
dence of false negative results;62 and (c) Home test kits do not allow
the retesting of results that often occurs in out-of-home testing,63 com-
promising diagnostic reliability.64
Concerns (a) and (b) are directly relevant to any home-testing
product's effectiveness and therefore should be considered by the
FDA in regard to each individual new device application. Sponsors of
60. Cheryl Clark, State Halts Marketing of Home AIDS Test, SAN DiEGO UMON-
Tam., Apr. 4, 1992, at A3 (citing the concerns of Stuart Richardson, head of the California
Food and Drug Branch of the State Department of Health Services).
61. According to evidence presented at the Tenth International Conference of AIDS
in Yokohama, Japan, during the summer of 1994, the concern that AIDS virus variants may
be undetected by particular tests is a legitimate one. See David P. Hamilton, New Variants
of AIDS Virus Found That Aren't Detected by Some Tests, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 1994, at B8.
62. Unacceptable levels of false negatives would suggest that a home-testing product
is not effective in achieving its essential function. The results could be devastating and
counterproductive, as those misdiagnosed may have relied on the false diagnoses in mak-
ing misguided behavioral decisions.
63. See Kevin Washington, Illegal "Home AIDS Test" Investigated, ST. PETERSBURG
TniMs, Oct. 30, 1993, at 1B (citing concerns of ACT UP member David Merrill regarding
the unavailability of retesting procedures in the use of HIV home-testing products).
64. The compromise of diagnostic reliability is potentially devastating in both the in-
stances of false positives and false negatives. False positives inflict unwarranted trauma on
the recipient of the results and may induce her to begin early treatments that, despite
harmful side-effects, are recommended for those who are HIV-positive. False negatives
create false security. A recipient of false negative results may have unsafe sex with another
partner who has been tested HIV-negative, thereby transmitting the disease. Moreover,
the asymptomatic recipient of a false negative report has no reason to consider potentially
beneficial early treatment options.
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HIV home-testing devices for which premarketing approval is sought
can and should be asked to provide persuasive evidence that the prod-
ucts work. The FDA can reasonably require proof that the normal
chain of custody of blood specimens does not create unacceptable im-
pairment of a test's accuracy; likewise, the agency should compel
sponsors to show that diagnostic accuracy of products will not be
unacceptably compromised by undetectable viral mutations likely to
arise during a product's foreseeable shelf-life. Under the standards I
recommend in Section IV regarding appropriate FDA scrutiny of
medical devices, these concerns fall within the recommended sphere
of agency evaluation. They are issues regarding whether the product,
used as directed, works to achieve the immediate, primary result for
which it has been created-in this case, accurate diagnosis of HIV
status.
While these concerns are appropriate for FDA consideration in
the process of case-by-case evaluation, they are not an appropriate
basis for rejecting HIV home-testing products as a class. Because
products developed in different laboratories have potentially different
characteristics, a blanket ban on home-testing kits on the basis of con-
cerns (a) and (b) is overinclusive and may result in the rejection of
products that are not susceptible to the purported risks. By rejecting
the blanket ban approach, the FDA would achieve two vital ends: 1)
it would encourage companies to develop home-testing products that
are not susceptible to the weaknesses at issue and 2) it would permit
each prospective manufacturer to prove the effectiveness of its
products.
Concern (c)-that is, the failure of home-testing products to al-
low for retesting of results-is less persuasive than concerns (a) and
(b). There is nothing in the nature of the home-testing kits at issue,
those which permit do-it-yourself specimen sampling but not do-it-
yourself diagnosis, 65 that renders the retesting of results any less via-
ble than in the context of on-site testing. Regardless of where they
are collected, blood samples are evaluated in professional laborato-
ries.66 The issues relevant to retesting concern the processes used to
65. Most products that have been developed to date are home-testing collection prod-
ucts rather than home analysis products. This means that the consumer collects the speci-
men, but does not conduct analysis of the specimen or interpret results. Whereas home
analysis and interpretation may hinder or complicate the ability to double-check results,
home sampling provides no such disadvantage. Should a sponsor eventually apply for
premarketing approval of a kit that ostensibly permits home analysis and interpretation,




evaluate samples, how reliable those processes are, and whether the
laboratories that do the testing decide to retest in order to improve
diagnostic accuracy. These are certainly crucial issues that affect the
overall effectiveness of HIV testing; however, they do not distinguish
on-site testing from home testing in any meaningful way. Analysts of
specimens provided through both on-site and at-home options can re-
test. Once specimens leave the person tested and are in the hands of
lab professionals, the two forms of testing become indistinguishable in
regard to retesting potential. Accordingly, diminished potential for
retesting is not a legitimate basis for rejecting the specimen-collection
variety of home-testing products.
As in the discussion of concerns (a) and (b), these observations
may change if we shift our attention away from the question of a blan-
ket ban and focus instead on a case-by-case evaluation of premarket-
ing approval applications. The FDA can set effectiveness standards
that reasonably require either particular retesting procedures or some
threshold diagnostic accuracy, regardless of how that accuracy is
achieved.67 Such standards ensure that all products, both on-site and
at-home, perform at effective levels of diagnostic accuracy. Provided
that the standards for all types of HIV-testing products are consistent,
the FDA can equitably require implementation of a retesting function
that enhances diagnostic accuracy.
C. Home Testing Fails to Account for Patients' Needs to Consult Medical
Professionals and Receive Medical Treatment
One commentator has suggested that the lIV home-testing pro-
cess provides "no way of knowing whether the person who tested
HIV-positive would inform the right people or get the right care."'68
Lisa Silverberg of the National Alliance of Lesbian and Gay Clinics,
who testified before the advisory panel against lifting the ban on HIV
home-testing products, evoked images of those who are misinformed
about HIV, AIDS, and testing and who "just don't believe [they] have
anywhere to turn for accurate medical information, or treatment for
[their] condition. '69 Likewise, the FDA has expressed a concern that
67. During the 1994 Panel proceedings, some members in fact recommended consid-
eration of mandatory confirmatory testing, at least in regard to positive or indeterminate
results. See Pilot Studies Recommended, supra note 43.
68. See Do-It-Yourself Diagnostic Kits, WASHINGTOmAN, Dec. 1992, (Features) (quot-
ing Julie Zawisza, Director of Diagnostic and Biomedical Technology for the Health Indus-
try Manufacturers Association).
69. Morning Edition (NPR radio broadcast, June 23, 1994) (transcript no. 1374-12).
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home-testing products may not account for a purchaser's need for
medical consultation and treatment. 70
At least under present conditions, these arguments are unpersua-
sive for two reasons: first, they fail to distinguish HIV home tests
from other home tests, and second, they fail to differentiate between
home testing and existing alternatives. Each of these reasons is dis-
cussed in detail below.
(1) Failure to Distinguish HIV Home Tests from Other Home Tests
Home-testing products in general serve limited rather than ple-
nary functions. They provide information to patients, but leave the
patients themselves responsible for seeking any medical or other pro-
fessional services that would appear to be advisable. In areas other
than HIV testing, we do not expect do-it-yourself diagnostic products
to serve public health needs apart from the conferral of the diagnosis
itself. Home pregnancy testing has not been rejected simply because
the products cannot ensure that pregnant women will seek medical
care. More recently, the FDA has approved home cholesterol testing,
apparently unconvinced that the failure of such tests to promote pro-
fessional consultation is a flaw in the safety or effectiveness of the
product.71 These decisions seem eminently reasonable because they
correctly identify the function of home-testing products-to provide
accurate diagnostic information to those consumers who seek it.
It is both unreasonable and superfluous to expect home-testing
products to secure the receipt of necessary or advisable treatment.
72
Consumers who are provided with health-related information can se-
cure the health care they deem advisable. Individuals administer
home tests because they are concerned about the state of their health;
there is no rational basis for assuming that the recipient of positive
test results is less likely to seek treatment or medical advice than the
person who has not engaged in home testing.73 Moreover, because
70. Home Testing Issues, supra note 37.
71. See Michael Schrage, The Next Medical Cost Explosion Could Start Right in Your
Home, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 1993, at F3.
72. Home-testing products can and should provide simple instructions regarding med-
ical care. Pregnancy tests, cholesterol tests, and HIV tests administered in the home can all
instruct users that positive results, or results in the high range in the instance of cholesterol
testing, indicate the advisability of seeking medical treatment.
73. This observation remains true even in light of the inequalities in access to medical
care in the United States. Lack of access based on poverty or uninsured status is likely to
impede some members of society from receiving the care they need; however, this impedi-
ment is unaffected by home test products. The person who cannot afford to receive medi-
cal treatment following the revelation of positive test results lacks the resources (or
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home testing expands access to vital information, the net number of
persons in need of medical care who seek and receive that care is
likely to expand rather than decrease.
(2) Failure to Distinguish Home Testing from Existing Alternatives
Even if we were to reject the arguments in Subsection (1) and
insist that home diagnostic products facilitate treatment, we cannot
reject home testing on the basis of this criterion without comparing it
to the other available options. Home testing should not be rejected
for failing to unite consumers and physicians if the alternatives are no
more effective in meeting this end.
In the absence of a home treatment alternative, persons have two
remaining choices: either they will remain untested, or they will seek
testing at clinical sites. Neither of these alternatives provides any sig-
nificant advantage over home testing in regard to treatment. Indeed,
some of those who would remain untested in the absence of a home-
testing option would lose the impetus to seek treatment. This is be-
cause diagnosis and treatment are often separate and ordinal steps.
Patients do not seek treatment until they have some indication of its
value or necessity. Some persons with AIDS symptoms will seek
treatment without testing in order to alleviate those symptoms; how-
ever, those who are asymptomatic or presymptomatic have no reason
to seek anticipatory treatment unless they have a diagnosis of infec-
tion. Therefore, home testing can be expected to increase rather than
decrease the number of persons infected with HIV who seek early
treatment.
Likewise, home diagnosis is unlikely to impede the receipt of
treatment relative to on-site diagnosis. Given the substantial amount
of HIV testing that is presently done through anonymous clinics es-
tablished mainly or solely for that purpose, the functions of diagnosis
and treatment have- been bureaucratically separated much further
than would be true under more traditional physician-patient testing
procedures. Typically, the clinics that administer HIV tests do not
provide medical services. Rather, they provide information and vari-
ous levels of pre- and post-test psychological counseling. The most
such clinics generally do in regard to the provision of actual health
care is to direct those who test positive to clinics or physicians who are
believes she lacks the resources, perhaps unaware of subsidized clinic options that may
exist) to make an initial on-site contact. The perception of inability to pay for an initial
visit would impede her from ever being tested at all, in the absence of home-test products.
Either way, she receives no medical treatment.
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able to provide treatment. This function can certainly be replicated by
home test products, either through packaging or via the telephone
linkages already proposed for provision of test results and telephone
counseling.
Moreover, some HIV-testing clinics provide little or no counsel-
ing at all, thus precluding a likely superiority of referral services. Ac-
cording to a statement issued jointly by doctors and AIDS activists, 56
percent of persons currently tested for H-IV in testing facilities re-
ported that they received no pre-test counseling, and 68 percent re-
ported that they received no post-test counseling.74 Most on-site
diagnoses are therefore unaccompanied by the kinds of medical refer-
rals that critics consider to be a vital component of post-test counsel-
ing capability. Even if one were to concede that counseling-based
referral is a vital component of HIV testing, the facilities that pres-
ently administer blood tests are not consistently serving this medical
treatment referral function.
In comparison, manufacturers of home-testing products are pre-
pared to provide telephone counseling to all customers. 75 Telephone
counselors have the same opportunity as in-person counselors to pro-
vide customers with information identifying available medical facili-
ties.76 Matching people with appropriate services is a function easily
served by telephone. Manufacturers willing to maintain counseling
and referral lines can provide consistent, uniform, easy access to phy-
sicians and clinics. Far from diminishing opportunities to direct pa-
tients to medical services, home-testing products have the potential to
improve the link between diagnosis and receipt of effective medical
treatment.77
74. Judy Mann, In the Privacy of Your Own Home, WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 1994, at E3.
75. Jacobs, supra note 40.
76. The argument that in-person counseling is superior to telephone counseling in
averting suicidal or other self-destructive behavior is at least plausible because personal
contact is likely to provide greater opportunities for providing warm, intimate support.
Moreover, a person being counseled cannot abandon an in-person contact as abruptly and
unilaterally as one can hang up a telephone.
In contrast, the provision of information identifying available medical treatment facili-
ties is relatively unemotional. There is no reason to suspect that the providers of home-
testing products will be any less effective in the administration of this function by tele-
phone than their on-site counseling counterparts.
77. Critics may logically contend that the quantitative comprehensiveness of counsel-
ing coverage that can be afforded by large manufacturers of home-testing products fails to
compensate for more qualitative differences that may exist between in-person and
telecommunicational counseling relations. There are three arguments that responded to
this concern. First, counseling hotlines, including suicide hotlines, have long provided vital
and effective telecommunicational counseling services. See Vanda Hark, A Look at the
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46
Critics of home test products have provided no evidence to sug-
gest that face-to-face counseling serves any necessary and irreplacea-
ble function in directing people to medical services. In this regard,
Silverberg's vision of the helpless masses who have no idea where to
find medical care78 is exaggerated. If people can find an on-site test-
ing facility, why can they not find medical care facilities?79 More to
the point, who are all these helpless people who are presumably un-
able to use a telephone book or directory assistance? 0 While a small
number of people may be incapable of locating medical resources by
themselves, any perceived governmental responsibility to guide them
toward such resources can be discharged by means that do not pre-
clude home testing.8 '
D. Home Testing Reduces the Likelihood that Recipients of Positive Test
Results Will Receive Effective Counseling
According to the National Alliance of Lesbian and Gay Health
Clinics, at-home testing may have a "catastrophic impact" on those
who receive positive test results without the availability of in-person
Work of the Telephone Counseling Center, 61 PFsoNN_L & GuiDANcE J. 110 (Oct. 1992);
Alan Rosenbaum & James F. Calhoun, The Use of the Telephone Hotline in Crisis Interven-
tion: A Review, 5 J. CommunrrY PsYcH. 325 (1977); Robert R. Waller & Lynn W. Lisella,
National AIDS Hotline" HIV and AIDS Information Through a Toll-Free Telephone Sys-
tem, 106 Pumtuc HEALTH REPORTS 628 (Nov.-Dec. 1991). Second, consumers deciding to
be tested for HIV can reasonably be expected to know that positive test results may be
traumatic. Since home-testing options do not replace on-site testing, but rather augment it
by providing an additional option, consumers can make reasoned decisions and choose
those options that provide face-to-face counseling if they prefer. Third, the potential quan-
titative comprehensiveness of home test counseling availability outweighs any dubious ad-
vantages associated with in-person counseling.
78. See supra note 69.
79. This comment is made with the knowledge that medical care is beyond the finan-
cial reach of an appalling number of persons in the United States today. For example,
approximately 40 million Americans were without health insurance in 1993, an increase of
more than 2 million from the preceding year. Peter Shinkle, Louisiana Leads Nation in
Uninsured Residents, THE ADVOCATE, Dec. 16, 1994, at 13A. While access to basic health
care is a vital public health concern in the 1990s, it is not a relevant factor in the context of
assessing HIV home-testing products. Limits on the opportunity of poor people to receive
health care is unaffected by whether persons receive HIV test results at home or on-site.
80. Of course, language barriers, class barriers, cultural differences, and fear can all
create impediments to receipt of services. These problems are real, and any meaningful
reform of health care and HIV/AIDS care must address them. Nonetheless, it is irrational
to assume that persons who can find a place to be tested for HIV cannot also find facilities
that provide medical care. The assumption is overindulgent in its dramatization of masses
of ostensibly victimized people who are deemed incapable of functioning in our society.
81. For example, bilingual placards identifying low-income health care facilities are
frequently seen in New York City subways.
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counseling, possibly resulting in an increased incidence of suicide82
among test result recipients. 83 According to one study, attempted sui-
cide rates among HIV-seropositive persons may be 40 times higher
than the general suicide rate.84 From this standpoint, some view the
receipt of life-or-death diagnoses in the home as poor policy.85 One
commentator has distinguished home testing for HIV from other
forms of home testing, arguing that a "counseling vacuum" which may
be acceptable for products such as pregnancy and cholesterol tests is
unacceptable for HIV tests.86 Presumably, the distinction is based on
the severity of AIDS, and the present lack of effective treatments for
the disease. During the hearings before the 1994 Panel, test-result re-
cipients87 and AIDS clinic counselors88 argued that provision of on-
site counseling is a necessary adjunct to any HIV-testing program that
is to avert suicidal responses to the receipt of information regarding
HIV status.89 Moreover, post-test counseling has been found to be
somewhat effective in reducing the subsequent incidence of sexually
82. For a discussion of suicide rates among persons with AIDS in general, see Peter
M. Marzuk et al., Increased Risk of Suicide in Persons with AIDS, 259 JAMA 1333 (1988).
83. Critics cite the example of a man who jumped from the Golden Gate Bridge on
March 27, 1994, after being informed of his HIV-positive status. See Vic Ostrowidzki,
Home HIV Test Alarms Clinics: Some Insist Results Require Counseling, S.F. EXAMINER,
Apr. 9, 1994, at Al, A8.
84. See James R. Rundell et al., Use of Home Test Kits for HIV is Bad Medicine, 262
JAMA 2385, 2385-86 (1989) (citing conference proceedings results suggesting that those
diagnosed HIV-positive under the U.S. Air Force's mandatory testing program have "a
suicide attempt rate at least 40 times higher than that of the air force in general.").
85. See Rogers, supra note 39 (quoting Professor James McEwen of Glasgow Univer-
sity, "It's clear these tests are going to be very attractive to people, but only if they tell
them what they want to hear. I don't think the idea of getting a life-or-death diagnosis
when you're alone at home is a particularly good one.").
86. See Barbara Yost, Home Remedy, PHOENIX GAZTrE, Feb. 22, 1993, at El (refer-
ring to comments by Arthur Levin, Director of the Center for Medical Consumers in New
York).
87. See News (CNN television broadcast, June 22, 1994) (transcript no. 902-5) (quot-
ing Hank Carde, "I was nearly suicidal for three days after I got my test results. And had I
not had competent post-test counseling, I would probably not be addressing you today.").
88. Id. (quoting Laura Hardesty, "Most people here [sic] HIV positive [as] a death
sentence. People don't want to hear that they have cancer over the phone. People don't
want to hear that they're HIV positive over the phone.").
89. While critics of home testing are concerned with the well-being of those who may
receive news of HIV status without psychological support, the Centers for Disease Control
have addressed the need for counseling from a different perspective-the role of counsel-
ing in encouraging behavioral changes that may curtail the spread of the virus by those
diagnosed seropositive. For detailed discussion of the CDC Recommendations for HIV
Counseling and Testing Services, see Technical Guidance on HIV Counseling, 269 JAMA
2072 (1993).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46
HIV HOME TESTING
transmitted diseases (STD) among testees.90 Therefore, it is likely
that HIV-negative testees who receive counseling will experience re-
duced rates of post-test HIV or other STD infection and that HIV-
positive testees who receive counseling will be less likely to transmit
STDs.
While these arguments are persuasive, they are not ultimately
compelling. The ostensible need for in-person counseling is suspect
for several reasons.
As noted in the previous Subsection, evidence suggests that on-
site HIV-testing facilities frequently provide little or no counseling to
those tested for 11V.91 This fact undermines the contention that
clinical testing is essential because it is the only source of adequate
counseling services. If clinical testing results in highly inconsistent
counseling experiences, including a complete absence of counseling in
many instances,92 then home testing may have the potential to provide
a consistency that is presently missing. As activists recommend provi-
sion of high-quality counseling in tandem with all HIV testing, corpo-
rations have powerful incentives to provide professional telephone
counseling opportunities to all consumers of their products. 93 Accord-
ingly, home testing is likely to exert a positive rather than a negative
influence on the quality and quantity of counseling services available
in conjunction with HIV-testing programs.
Moreover, the assumption that the telephone counseling pro-
vided by home test developers would be inferior to on-site counseling,
and would therefore result in increased numbers of tragic responses to
IV information, is not supported by either data or well-reasoned
speculation.94 Telephone counseling by experienced professionals has
the potential to be superior in quality to on-site counseling. Ross Eck-
90. M.W. Otten, Jr., et al., Changes in Sexually Transmitted Disease Rates After HIV
Testing and Posttest Counseling, 83 AM. J. PuB. HEA.T 529 (1993).
91. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
92. Id.
93. These incentives are a function of at least four considerations: products accompa-
nied by availability of post-test counseling will or might (i) be attractive to at least some
consumers; (ii) be more likely to receive marketing approval under the FDA's presently
broad-based scrutiny; (iii) reduce the likelihood of post-use suicide; and (iv) provide a
potential defense against any wrongful death or negligence claims that might be brought
against manufacturers.
94. Drug Res. Rep., 15 GRAYr SHuET No. 15, Apr. 10, 1989, at 7 (quoting Howard
Markman, Director of the University of Denver Center for Marital and Family Studies,
"[W]e have no reason to conclude that telephone counseling would do any worse than
face-to-fact counseling and in fact, the data suggest that it would do about the same.")
[hereinafter GRAY SHmEm].
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ert, a proponent of home testing since the 1980s, has observed that
telephone counseling by full-time, professional counselors may be as
effective as or more effective than person-to-person counseling by
physicians who engage in HIV counseling only infrequently. 95 This
makes intuitive sense because corporate sponsors of home-testing
products can train counselors specifically to engage in full-time HIV-
counseling. The potential superiority of telephone counselors would
be derived from their specific training as HIV counselors and from the
experience they would receive from performing that function on a
full-time basis. Both training and experience can provide profession-
als with a level of expertise difficult to replicate among physicians en-
gaged in more diversified activities. Moreover, when corporations
dedicate personnel exclusively to the function of counseling, they
eliminate distractions associated with pressures to serve other, reve-
nue-producing functions. 96 Many physicians must sacrifice limitless
care based on the more pragmatic necessity of seeing a minimum
number of paying patients. 97 In contrast, telephone counselors who
produce no direct revenue can be permitted to provide varying
amounts of care to different customers under different circum-
stances.98 Provided that manufacturers impose no service quotas or
time limits on their counselors, such personnel would be unsusceptible
to the normal business pressures that can divert on-site physicians
from their counseling tasks. 99
95. 51 Pink Sheet No. 18, Trade and Gov. Memos, May 1, 1989.
96. An analogy may be drawn here from successful corporate counseling programs
utilizing dedicated staff for drug and alcohol counseling. See Arthur Johnson & Nancy
O'Neill, Employee Assistance Programs and the Troubled Employee in the Public Sector
Workplace, 9 REv. OF PUBLIC PERSONN, EL ADMINISTRATION 66 (Summer 1989).
97. Physicians in individual or small group practice also lack other resources that con-
fer potential advantage to corporate sponsors. For example, large corporations can pro-
vide 24-hour telephone counseling service availability. Doctors in small practices, however
devoted to their patients, cannot reasonably be expected to provide high-quality, around-
the-clock counseling services.
98. In regard to potential suicide induced by the trauma of receiving test results, a
counselor's ability to devote varying amounts of time to different patients is obviously
crucial. Counselors instructed and enabled to provide a customer with any necessary
amount of support, in terms of both length of each call and number of calls, need never
leave a customer without a professional to consult.
99. Obviously, telephone counseling services provided to support a privately mar-
keted consumer product would vary in quality. The important point here is that such ad-
junct counseling has the potential to exceed the quality of much on-site counseling.
Therefore, the FDA cannot justify categorical rejection of home-testing products on the
basis of inadequate counseling opportunities. If the agency is concerned with such oppor-
tunities and if it insists on considering this adjunct before approving a product that is other-
wise safe and effective, it can provide guidelines or requirements to protect quality. These
guidelines could include minimum numbers of full-time counselors to be hired in propor-
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Finally, the assumption that in-person notification of HIV-status
is categorically superior to telephone notification of HIV status is
speculative. Hardesty's contention that "[p]eople don't want to hear
that they're HIV positive over the phone"1 ° is a gross generalization.
Given the highly personal nature of HIV testing, an equally valid con-
jecture is that many people in fact would prefer to hear that they are
HIV positive over the phone rather than in person. Indeed, the large
market for home-testing products in general and the predicted de-
mand for HIV home-testing products in particular, are suggestive of
this alternative perspective. Some people, including the author of this
Article, would prefer to get life-altering information in the privacy of
their homes where they can process and reflect upon the information
without the unwanted intrusion of strangers. 01 From this perspective,
those who seek to force unrequested counseling "opportunities" on
everyone tested for HIV may reflect a society so enamored with coun-
seling and therapy as to find inconceivable the values of self-reliance,
independence, and self-help.
E. Home Testing Will Undermine the Network of Community Clinics
that Presently Offer HIV Testing and Counseling
During the 1994 Panel hearings, activist Corey Dubin testified
that community-based HIV-testing clinics would be "wiped out" by an
HIV home test product.1°2 While this prediction is obviously specula-
tive, the utilization of HIV-testing clinics certainly would decrease as
persons chose a viable home-testing alternative. This possibility of
losing market share to substitute products is a threat to which private
sector firms have long been accustomed. 0 3 While the prospect of a
piecemeal obliteration of on-site testing may be hyperbole, potential
incursions of home testing are a realistic threat to the viability of on-
site facilities.
Nonetheless, the scenario under which public testing facilities are
besieged by at-home alternatives is not a compelling reason for the
tion to the quantity of kits sold, as well as minimum training and qualification standards for
on-line counselors.
100. See supra note 88.
101. See GRAY SHran, supra note 94 (citing commentary by Howard Markman, sug-
gesting that people may be more comfortable with telephone counseling than with in-per-
son counseling).
102. John Schwartz, Advisors Start as Listeners on Home Testing for HIV, WASH. POST,
July 7, 1994, at A17.
103. See MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETrrvE STRATEGY: TEcaIQUEs FOR ANALYZ-
ING INDUSTRIES AND COmETrrORS 23-24 (1980).
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FDA to proscribe the latter. Perhaps most importantly, the FDA
should not extend its discretion to include the making of economic
and social policy. It is one thing to decide whether a home-testing
product can be used safely and effectively; it is far more presumptuous
to determine the market effects of such a product on the potential
survival of competing organizations, be they for-profit or not-for-
profit.
Moreover, the threat of extinction posed to clinics by home-test-
ing alternatives should be seen as a positive rather than a negative
force. On-site HIV-testing clinics should remain open only as long as
they provide needed services that cannot be more effectively and effi-
ciently provided otherwise. This is particularly true in a climate
wherein many HIV-related and AIDS-related demands must be met
by limited resources. 1°4 The closing of unneeded facilities may indeed
be a by-product of home-testing products. If testing facilities continue
to serve desirable functions, the public and private dollars that pres-
ently support them will continue to support them. However, if the
need for the facilities decreases, then the weeding out of the superflu-
ous will leave more resources for AIDS research, prevention, and
care.
F. Approval of Home-testing Kits May Inadvertently Provide Employers
with the Means of Discriminating Against Persons with HIV
or AIDS
Home testing critics have identified potential misuse of do-it-
yourself HIV-testing products. For example, critics argue that em-
ployers may surreptitiously use the kits to test their employees for
HIV. 10 5 Home test kits would provide employers with the capability
to test employees or prospective employees quickly, easily, secretly,
and without resort to any necessary intervention of health care profes-
sionals. This faculty would enhance an employer's ability to fire or
refuse to hire persons who are HIV-positive, with reduced risk of lia-
bility for illegal discrimination. 10 6
104. For a discussion of the adequacy of AIDS funding in general, see Allan M.
Brandt, AIDS: From Social History to Social Policy, 14 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 231,
238 (1986). The problem is exacerbated as AIDS funding is cut to meet competing needs.
See, e.g., Cindy Rugeley, Funding Cuts over AIDS Anger Official, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 8,
1993, at A19.
105. Testing: FDA Debates Home Test for AIDS, AIDS WKLY., July 4, 1994 [hereinaf-
ter Testing].
106. The elimination of health care professionals as testing intermediaries increases the
likelihood that furtive, illegal testing and discrimination practices will be unobserved. The
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The specter of employer abuse is neither incredible nor unduly
alarmist; it is reasonable to believe that the do-it-yourself technology
of HIV home-testing products will facilitate both illegal testing and
illegal discrimination by unscrupulous employers.107 The policy ques-
tion that follows from this observation is whether the potential for
abuse of an otherwise beneficial product justifies wholesale FDA re-
jection of the product. In the context of free markets, the answer to
this question must be no. Society should not outlaw all potentially
abused but otherwise beneficial products. Because most products can
be abused, 08 outlawing potentially abused products is tantamount to
outlawing most products. By prohibiting the sale of goods that can be
abused, we would ban virtually everything.
This observation leaves us with straightforward, if obvious, policy
choices-we can ban all products or we can ban only those products
for which predicted cost of abuse exceeds predicted benefit of use.
We must choose the latter alternative if we are to avoid the annihila-
tion of all consumption; furthermore, society can and does establish
laws to prohibit abuse of products, as well, as enforcement structures
to make those laws meaningful. Banning all products is obviously a
ludicrous option because the products themselves are not the prob-
lem; rather, the unlawful practices of those who abuse them that are
the problem. Accordingly, banning home-testing products simply be-
cause some may be tempted to use them for evil purposes focuses
policy attention on the wrong issue. It is the illegal employment prac-
tices of employers, and not the products that may be used in the pro-
cess, that are bad. If we ban home-testing products, we lose more
than we gain-any benefit of thwarting wrongdoers is outweighed by
the potential loss of lives.10 9 Accordingly, the best solution to abuse
of valuable products is the establishment of effective laws and sanc-
fewer the people whose expertise is necessary to execute testing, the fewer the opportuni-
ties for whistle-blowing. Moreover, elimination of the presence of health care workers also
removes the presence of independent professionals whose ethical and professional training
may forestall or deter testing for suspect purposes.
107. Such discrimination may be a function of bias against persons with AIDS gener-
ally, or against persons in high risk groups such as homosexual men. Claims alleging both
forms of discrimination have been filed in recent years. See, e.g., Jennifer Cohen, Big
Deals, Big Suits, THE RECORDER, Apr. 8, 1993, at 5.
108. Computers have created new opportunities for theft of information and other var-
iants of high-technology crime. Improved copying technology has made the job of the
counterfeiter easier. Automobiles have facilitated quick getaways in countless gangster
movies and in the less dramatic real-life scenarios that they mimic. In fact, it is difficult to
imagine a product that cannot be linked to the prospect of both use and abuse.
109. For discussion of how lIV home-testing products are likely to save lives, see infra
notes 137-142 and accompanying text.
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tions.11 0 Penalties for illegal testing and discrimination must be suffi-
ciently severe, and the enforcement mechanisms should create an
adequately substantial risk of being caught and successfully prose-
cuted. Such penalties will not entirely eliminate the incremental risk
of illegal activity that is a by-product of any new technology. How-
ever, they are more acceptable than complete rejection of a technol-
ogy that has the potential to yield so much social benefit.
11. Arguments Favoring Home Testing
A. Home Testing Provides Easy Access to Information Regarding
Personal HIV Status"'
HIV-testing access issues concern convenience to all prospective
testees, as well as feasibility for those facing particular impediments to
traditional laboratory testing. Groups especially likely to benefit from
home testing include residents of rural areas, single parents, the physi-
cally disabled, and those whose personal and family obligations act as
a constraint on the desire to be tested." 2 Access to testing is increas-
ingly recognized as a vitally important component of AIDS policy be-
cause those who discover they are HIV-positive can get early
treatment for themselves and can help stem the spread of the disease
by refraining from risky activities,1 3 as shall be discussed in greater
detail in the Subsections that follow.
In 1989 the deputy director of the AIDS program at the Centers
for Disease Control suggested that lack of access may be exaggerated,
noting, "The CDC does not believe that there are substantial numbers
of people who cannot gain access to counseling and testing services in
110. For a discussion of laws that may apply to discrimination against persons with
HIV or AIDS, see Frederick T. Smith, AIDS-Based Employment Discrimination in the
American and Canadian Workplace, 10 COMP. LAB. L.J. 531 (1989); Andrew A. Martin,
Note, Title VII Discrimination in Biochemical Testing for AIDS and Marijuana, 1988 DuKE
L.J. 129.
111. See Home Testing Issues, supra note 37.
112. Judy Mann, In the Privacy of Your Own Home, WASH. PosT, Apr. 22, 1994, at E3.
113. Elliott J. Millenson, AIDS Tests: Do It Yourself?: FDA's No-Home-Testing Policy
Is Endangering Everyone, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 1989, at C5. Knowledge of HIV status is
particularly crucial given the long incubation period of the AIDS virus-often cited as
averaging approximately 10 years from infection date to symptoms-during which time
many persons infected do not know that they are carrying the virus.
For reference to the average period from HIV infection to manifestation of symptoms
of AIDS and to the virus's latency in general, see S.T. Butera & T.M. Folks, Application of
Latent HIV-1 Infected Cellular Models to Therapeutic Intervention, 8 AIDS REs. HUM.
RETROVIRUSES 991, 991 (1992); Daniel P. Bednarik & T.M. Folks, Mechanisms of HIV-1
Latency, 6 AIDS 3 (1992); Douglas S. Goodin et al., Long Latency Event-Related Potentials
in Patients Infected with Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 27 NEUROL. 414 (1990).
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either a public or private health care setting."1 14 While this statement
may be true, it presumes that access is a binary issue, determined by
whether a person absolutely can or cannot reach a clinical site for test-
ing. Given the value of maximizing the number of persons voluntarily
tested, it makes sense to view the question of access more broadly. A
narrow and technical conception of access would simply assess how
many people can overcome all physical, geographic, financial, and
psychological obstacles to being publicly tested. A broader, more
loosely defined, and more useful conception of access determines how
many people would consider in-home testing marginally accessible11
5
and on-site testing marginally inaccessible.1 6 This notion is more
pragmatic, recognizing that access is not in practice defined as "attain-
ment at any cost." Under such a rigid standard, access issues would be
relatively minor. The broader definition of access accounts for imped-
iments that actually hinder persons from being tested. Even if people
can technically surmount them, these impediments nonetheless impair
availability by reducing the ease and the net perceived utility of being
tested. As a result, even obstacles to a loosely defined access will re-
duce the number of people willing to pay the financial and emotional
price of testing. Consequently, fewer people are tested as a result of
reduced access. Given the value of testing, society cannot afford even
scalable barriers to HIV-testing access.
114. See Rick Weiss, Mail-Order AIDS Tests: FDA Confronts the Implications, 135 Sci.
NEws 268, 268 (1989) (quoting Stephen Bowen).
115. In-home testing is "marginally accessible" when the decision maker determines
that the costs of exploiting a technically feasible option are worth bearing.
116. In-home testing is "marginally inaccessible" when the decision maker determines
that the costs of exploiting a technically feasible option are not worth bearing.
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B. Home Testing Provides Enhanced Confidentiality and Anonymity 117
in Testing for HIV Status118
Both AIDS and HIV-positive status have been a source of social
stigma ever since the AIDS virus was identified by scientists. 119 In
part, the stigma associated with AIDS and AIDS-related conditions
results from their high incidence among socially marginalized groups,
particularly gay men and intravenous drug users.120 The CDC's recog-
nition of the importance of confidentiality in HIV testing reflects an
understanding that those considering testing are concerned with po-
tential discrimination. 121 Accordingly, some persons are likely to be
intimidated by public arena HIV testing, even when those test sites
promise ostensible anonymity. 22 Moreover, some supporters of
home testing have suggested that historically disenfranchised groups
of persons who are most likely to benefit from AIDS testing are
among those most likely to reject public HIV testing because of
117. I am using the terms "confidentiality" and "anonymity" loosely and synonymously
in this discussion to refer to the belief of those considering testing that their results will not
be available for use outside the professional diagnostic setting.
In their more specific usage, the terms often indicate two different methods of
ensuring secrecy in HIV diagnosis: confidential testing often refers to testing situations in
which the health care professionals know the identity of their client or patient, but are
under legal and/or ethical obligation to maintain professional secrecy regarding the testing
incident and the test results; anonymous testing often refers to testing situations in which
the client does not divulge her true identity, and is given test results by identification
number or code name only. The latter method has the potential advantage of providing
clients with increased assurance that confidentiality will not be breached, either
intentionally or inadvertently. For a discussion of one study of these two methods of
ensuring privacy, see Differences Between Anonymous and Confidential Registrants for
HIV Testing-Seattle, 1986-92, 269 JAMA 1094 (1993).
118. See Home Testing Issues, supra note 37.
119. For a discussion of the stigma associated with AIDS, see Estate of Behringer v.
Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251, 1269-70 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1991) (quoting Larry Gostin, Hospi-
tals, Health Care Professionals, and AIDS: The "Right to Know" the Health Status of Pro-
fessionals and Patients, 48 MD. L. REV. 12, 46 (1989)); Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671, 680
(E.D. Pa. 1990).
120. According to one survey, 20 percent of persons polled believed that people with
HIV received "their rightful due." Robert J. Blendon & Karen Donelan, Discrimination
Against People with AIDS: The Public's Perspective, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1022, 1023
(1988).
121. Recommendations for HIV Testing Services for Inpatients and Outpatients in
Acute-Care Hospital Settings, 269 JAMA 2071, 2071-72 (1993) [hereinafter CDC
Recommendations].
122. See Editorial, Let Them Have AIDS Tests: Home Test Kits Can Help Slow the
Virus Down, BUFFALO NEWS, June 24, 1994, at C2 ("Some fearful people who might want
to avoid appearing at a public clinic could still be tested with a home kit if such a product
were approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.").
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fear.123 It is therefore not surprising that 20 percent of Americans
surveyed by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention regis-
tered a preference for home-testing kits over present testing
options.124
Assurance of anonymity is likely to be greater for those using
home-testing kits than for those who consider making an appointment
in a public facility. Home testing, which entails private specimen sam-
pling, processing by mail, use of identification numbers, and commu-
nication of test results by telephone, incurs no face-to-face contact.
While telephone contact is the factor most likely to evoke hostility to
home testing among critics, it is intuitively appealing to the average
consumer who seeks assurance of anonymity. The anonymity associ-
ated with home testing is relatively secure because the consumer of
the home test can identify all of the steps in the process and observe
no opportunity for breach of confidentiality.125
Conversely, the person considering public testing will generally
have less pre-testing information regarding the precise nature of the
process, given the variety of methods presently employed in HIV test-
ing.126 Any true anonymity that is provided by physicians or clinics is
not as intuitively obvious as the anonymity that exists in the privacy of
the home. As a result, some less informed persons will shun public
testing facilities, unaware that anonymity is a possibility. Even those
who are better informed may avoid public testing clinics, reasonably
123. See Hamil R. Harris, Medical Groups, AIDS Activists Reject At-Home Testing,
WASH. PosT, Apr. 9, 1994, at G1, G5 (quoting Tom Mosley, formerly of AIDS Project Los
Angeles, "It's the anonymity factor that allows ... disenfranchised people to access results
and counseling they were earlier unable to access because of fear.").
124. See Testing, supra note 105.
125. Assurance of confidentiality is compromised by any public health policy that
would mandate the abrogation of secrecy in the interest of maximizing public information.
Even if test results are confidential at the time they are rendered, testees may worry that
alterations in policy may force testers to provide lists of those infected to some government
authority. For a discussion of the issue of confidentiality as it relates to public health inter-
ventions, see Roger Doughty, Comment, The Confidentiality of HPV-Related Information:
Responding to the Resurgence of Aggressive Public Health Interventions in the AIDS Epi-
demic, 82 CAL. L. Rav. 113 (1994).
126. These include testing by personal physicians, in which confidentiality is a function
of the physician-patient relationship, and the more anonymous testing accomplished in
clinics where the client is furnished with an identification number and is not required or
expected to reveal her identity. Even in the latter instance, anonymity is not certain be-
cause face-to-face contact always brings some possibility that the professionals with whom
the client has contact will not be strangers. Moreover, some may decide to avoid the possi-
bility of being seen in waiting rooms of clinics designated either partially or exclusively for
HIV testing, particularly in rural and suburban areas where they may be more likely to
meet neighbors or other acquaintances.
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fearing stigma associated with being seen at such facilities. Given re-
cent calls for the quarantine of people with AIDS or HIV, 2 7 all pro-
spective testees are justified in indulging a healthy skepticism in
regard to any process, the confidentiality of which falls beyond their
own personal control. 28
C. Home Testing Will Increase the Number of Persons Who Test for
At the time of the 1994 Panel Hearings, more than 85 percent of
Americans, many of whom are in higher risk categories,12 9 remained
untested for HIV.' 30 Yet increasing numbers of public health experts
continue to recommend HIV testing for as many people as possible,
rather than only for targeted groups.' 3 ' For several reasons, home
testing would provide persons who to date have declined to be tested
for HIV with new incentives to do so.
As noted in the preceding Subsection, greater and more reliable
assurances of anonymity would be associated with home-testing prod-
ucts. Home testing would alleviate the fear of publicity and ultimately
127. See, e.g., Edward A. Fallone, Note, Preserving the Public Health: A Proposal to
Quarantine Recalcitrant AIDS Carriers, 68 B.U. L. REv 441 (1988) (discussing the quaran-
tine of recalcitrant AIDS carriers as an effective option to stop the spread of AIDS).
128. Related to but not identical to the anonymity question is the notion that HIV
testing is personal and therefore evokes privacy concerns for most who consider being
tested. Stephan Coonan, President of Health Test Inc., has observed that HIV testing elic-
its basic privacy concerns. See James M. Gomez, Judge Orders Showdown on HIV Home-
Test Kit, L.A. TimFs (Orange County ed.), Oct. 20, 1993, at D8. These concerns include,
but are not limited to, protection of anonymity. Whereas anonymity concerns focus on
controlling public disclosure of private facts, privacy considerations also include the right
to be alone during highly personal experiences, especially when the technology exists to
support recognition of the right to be alone.
129. The notion of "high risk" categories as a meaningful basis for making distinctions
in public policy is dangerous. Conceptions of AIDS as a "gay disease," for example, are
inaccurate in light of rapidly increasing infection rates among groups not typically consid-
ered to be at high risk. Limiting recommendation of HIV testing to specific risk classes is
potentially destructive in two ways-it perpetuates the belief among people outside those
groups that they are at little or no risk of contagion, and it discourages some infected
persons in so-called low risk groups from being tested and receiving early treatment.
130. Warren E. Leary, Government Panel Hears Call for Expanded AIDS Testing, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 23, 1994, at A18 (citing testimony of C. Everett Koop during the 1994 Advi-
sory Panel hearings).
131. Chyang T. Fang et al., HIV Testing and Patient Counseling, 23 PArmrr CARE,
Oct. 30, 1989, at 19 ("Many physicians prefer to limit HIV antibody testing to those clearly
at risk for infection, while public health experts increasingly recommend the voluntary
testing of almost everyone. Targeting only those known to be in high-risk groups, or even
those known to practice behaviors that place them at risk, may be inadequate to control
the spread of HIV infection .... ").
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increase the total number of persons tested.132 Ironically, the pur-
ported need for face-to-face counseling itself discourages some people
from receiving an HIV test. People concerned with anonymity are
likely to be especially hindered by knowledge that clinic testing is car-
ried out with the condition that those being tested subject themselves
to mandatory counseling.
133
Even among those not intimidated by or suspicious of on-site
testing, home-use products have the potential to increase the inci-
dence of testing. These products will be more convenient to some
consumers than out-of-home testing. Convenience of products such
as the recently approved cholesterol home-testing kit'34 is likely to
account for some product demand, given the relatively low to nonexis-
tent stigma associated with cholesterol testing. 35 Analogously, HIV
home-testing products will lure some purchasers who are not fright-
ened of the public nature of on-site testing, but who simply lack the
time or initiative to take the two trips that are generally necessary to
be tested outside the home. 36 Persons in this category add another
132. Former Surgeon.General C. Everett Koop, in his capacity as a consultant to Direct
Access Diagnostics, one of the applicants seeking approval of an HIV home-testing prod-
uct, has suggested that home testing has the potential to triple the number of persons
tested. Moreover, according to statistics from the Centers for Disease Control, 24 percent
of persons who have not been tested to date would use an HV home-testing kit. See
Marlene Cimons, FDA Panel Reopens Debate on Home AIDS Test Kits, L.A. TIMEs, June
23, 1994, at A10. In their recommendations regarding IIV testing for inpatients and out-
patients in acute care hospital settings, the CDC has recognized that assurance of confiden-
tiality is a crucial component of increased HIV testing. See CDC Recommendations, supra
note 121.
133. See Ostrowidzki, supra note 83, at A-8 (quoting a statement made by four physi-
cians engaged in AIDS research, "As long as we require face-to-face confrontation as a
condition of getting tested, a significant number of Americans will continue to avoid being
tested or will not return for the results.").
134. See Susan Brink et al., Health Alert: Ten Important Recent Medical Developments
that Could Have an Impact on Your Well-Being, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP., May 16, 1994,
at 87 (discussing the home-testing cholesterol kit recently approved for marketing by the
FDA).
135. Compared to HIV testing, cholesterol testing does not evoke commensurate em-
barrassment or concern regarding confidentiality. Because cholesterol home testing meets
no pressing need for privacy, the rationale explaining prospective demand must lie else-
where. The most obvious explanations are convenience and cost advantages. If the de-
mand for cholesterol home testing is in part a function of convenience, as appears
reasonably likely, then demand for HIV home testing is likely to derive in part from the
same convenience factor.
136. Typically, the person tested must go to a clinic or physician once to have blood
drawn and again to receive test results. Because of the disfavor of telecommunication of
test results and associated telephone counseling discussed in Section Im(D), test results are
rarely given over the telephone. Accordingly, being tested within the present system re-
quires a moderately substantial commitment of time, as well as a constancy of the desire to
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increment to the percentage of total population tested, that would be
attributable to the provision of a home-testing alternative.
D. Increased Testing for H1V Will Diminish the Spread of AIDS by
Diminishing the Incidence of New Infections
Since the late 1980s, commentators and FDA panel witnesses
have asserted that increased testing will result in a reduction in the
number of future HIV infections.137 As home-testing options expand
opportunities for HIV testing and as more people learn their HIV sta-
tus, more people will also recognize an obligation to alter sexual be-
havioral patterns in order to reduce the risk of infecting others.
138
Indeed, a desire to curb the spread of AIDS has been shown to be
among the most prevalent factors explaining the decision to be tested
for HIV.
139
It has been said of AIDS that "denial and ignorance are its fa-
vored multipliers.' 140 Conversely, knowledge and information give
individuals the power to curb the disease. Maximization of knowledge
and information, including awareness of one's own HIV status, is par-
ticularly important in regard to fighting AIDS. Scientific and medical
researchers have been thwarted in identifying vaccinations, cures, and
know one's status. This commitment requirement can reduce the total number of persons
tested in two ways-some will fail to make the initial decision to be tested, and some will
decide to be tested but, upon losing energy or losing heart, will decide not to keep either
the first or the second appointment. Home testing virtually eliminates many of these po-
tential initiative barriers.
137. See Rebecca Kohlberg, UPI REGIONAL NEws, Apr. 6, 1989, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, UPI File (quoting William Johnston, Vice President of the Hudson Institute,
"To continue to prohibit... [home testing] is to condemn some Americans to death as a
result of inadvertent transmission of HIV," and observing Johnston's supporting statement
that, at the time of the hearings, approximately 90 percent of those infected were unaware
of their HIV status). See also Deborah Potter, At-Home HIV Testing Creates Renewed
Controversy (CNN cable broadcast, June 22, 1994) (citing the testimony of Mary Fisher,
who suggested that increased access to home testing might have prevented her infection
with HIV, which was transmitted by her husband).
138. This statement contains an obvious leap of faith-that the net number of persons
aware of the HIV-positive status who practice safer sex or celibacy will be greater than the
net number of persons who might conceivably attempt to spread the disease by practicing
unsafe sex more frequently. Notwithstanding the rare accounts of persons who fall in the
latter category, my arguments in this Section are predicated upon the belief that the vast
majority of persons with HIV or AIDS prefer to curb rather than unleash new incidents of
infection.
139. J.L. Jones et al., HIV Seroprevalence and Reasons for Refusing and Accepting HIV
Testing, 20 J. SEX. TRANSM. Dis. 334 (1993).
140. Debra J. Saunders, Counseling or Death, S.F. CHRON., June 27, 1994, at A19.
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effective treatments for this disease.141 Since HIV is contagious, the
absence of vaccinations and efficacious post-infection responses leaves
modification of behavior as the most promising inhibitor.142 We pres-
ently have few choices for deterring future suffering and death related
to AIIDS. Society must exploit those options that do exist. The link
between increased testing and decreased rates of infection should be
the dispositive factor in any discussions of the public policy concerns
regarding safe and effective HIV home-testing products. The FDA
cannot afford to indulge in paternalistic protection of every imagina-
ble public vulnerability at the cost of neglecting weapons that are
available to curb the spread of AIDS.
E. Increased Testing Permits Presymptom Monitoring and Intervention
Among a Greater Number of Infected Persons' 43
People aware of their seropositive status are likely to be more
vigilant in the presymptom monitoring of their health than they would
be in the absence of such knowledge. Vigilance has become more im-
portant as medical and scientific experts have begun to place in-
creased emphasis on both presymptomatic and early treatment of
AIDS.144 Because early medical intervention is advisable,145 HIV
testing serves a crucial diagnostic function, increasing the numbers of
people who receive drugs that act as prophylaxis for pneumocystis
carinii pneumonia and other manifestations of AIDS. 46 Whereas
141. For an excellent discussion of the challenges and frustrations of AIDS research,
see Wayne C. Koff & Daniel F. Hoth, Development and Testing of AIDS Vaccines, 241
SCIENcE 426 (July 22, 1988).
142. Behavioral changes that can curb the spread of AIDS include practicing safer sex
or celibacy and reducing the sharing of hypodermic needles. At a recent international
conference on AIDS, experts observed that the best prospects for battling the disease,
given the discouraging scientific progress to date in the development of applied treatments
or cures, is to address the manner in which behaviors can potentially be altered to avoid
new transmissions of the virus. For example, "[P]ublic health officials... say that science's
inability to deal with AIDS to date makes it ever more urgent to find ways to change the
behavior that spreads AIDS." AIDS Treatments Could Pose Danger, ST. Louis PosT-DIs-
PATCH, June 6, 1993, at 9A.
143. See Mann, supra note 112, at E3.
144. Se4 ag., Jean McCann, Giving AZT Early May Prevent Progression to AIDS,
DRUG Topics, Aug. 6, 1990, at 14. While hopes that presymptom use of AZT might pre-
vent AIDS have proven false, the drug is still prescribed to some asymptomatic persons
with HIV in the belief that it can palliate or delay the onset of AIDS.
145. Id.
146. The literature currently supports the use of a large variety of preventive measures
in regard to IY infection. See John F. Jewett et al., Preventive Health Care for Adults
with HIV Infection, 269 JAMA 1144, 1144 (1993) (listing the following efficacious preven-
tive measures: "primary and secondary Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia prophylaxis; sec-
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some early AIDS activists were critical and suspicious of testing, fo-
cusing on potential abuses of information, most are now supportive of
expanded HIV testing147 as a means of directing crucial medical care
to the greatest number of those who need it at the earliest possible
moment of intervention. 148 Home-testing products that provide accu-
rate diagnostic information can increase the pool of persons who
know their HIV status and can therefore make informed, timely deci-
sions regarding their treatment.
F. Home Testing Has the Potential to Be Less Expensive than On-Site
Testing
Home-testing options in the forms presently proposed would cost
less to administer than out-of-home testing. I refer here to the real
cost of on-site testing, not to the price charged to those tested.149 The
cost of clinical testing includes facility overhead and payment of pro-
fessional and nonprofessional workers employed by the facility.
Home testing invokes economic efficiencies by eliminating unneces-
sary overhead and labor costs. 50
Manufacturers of proposed HIV home tests suggest that they
could be sold for anywhere between five and forty dollars.151 In con-
ondary prophylaxis of Cryptococcus, Toxoplasma, and cytomegalovirus infections;
tuberculin testing, with chemotherapy for individuals with positive test results; syphilis
screening; Papanicolaou tests; educational measures to reduce the transmission of HIV and
other infections; t-lymphocyte monitoring; and antiretroviral therapy in selected patients."
Also, noting a large number of additional "[r]ecommended measures of possible, but less
certain, effectiveness ....").
147. See Gerald H. Friedland, Early Treatment for HIV: The Time Has Come, 322
NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1000 (1990); Recommendations for Zidovudine: Early Infection, 263
JAMA 1606 (1990); Centers for Disease Control, Guidelines for Prophylaxis Against
Pneumocystis Carinii Pneumonia for Persons Infected with Human Immunodeficiency Vi-
rus, 38 MoxRBDrry & MORTALrry WKL. RE'. (Supp. 5), 1989, at 1.
148. Sandor Katz, HIV Testing-A Phony Cure, NATION, May 28, 1990, at 738 (noting
that although early intervention is crucial, testing should nonetheless be up to the
individual).
149. In other words, individuals sometimes have access to so-called "free" HIV testing.
Such testing is not actually free, but rather subsidized by some external governmental or
charitable entity.
150. Obviously, some fixed costs of testing cannot be eliminated simply by relocating
the sample collection process to the home. For example, personnel to engage in laboratory
analysis and in counseling will be utilized in either instance. However, other costs are
associated with processing persons through the clinic itself. These costs include the use of
support staff and the maintenance of the facility that would be replaced by the home via
do-it-yourself collection.
151. University of Florida medical researcher Roger Clemons has cited $5.00 as a real-
istic possibility for the OraScreen HIV Rapid Test Kit. Delthia Ricks, Home Test For HIV
on the Way, ORLANDO SENTuEL TRIB.. May 29, 1992, at Al. The predicted price tag for
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trast, on-site facilities can incur costs into the hundreds of dollars per
test.152 Home testing can obviously incur substantial economic effi-
ciency over more expensive medical and clinical testing. Moreover,
because those who opt for home testing would purchase the kits them-
selves, sometimes in lieu of using subsidized anonymous testing clinics
that charge no fee to those tested, FDA marketing approval could al-
leviate pressures on already strained government budgets. 53 Re-
sources currently used to finance anonymous, so-called "free" clinical
testing could be diverted to other needs, 54 including research budgets
and AIDS patient care.
G. The At-Home Testing Option Is Desirable Because It Enhances the
Ability of Consumers to Make ree Choices Among a Greater
Number of Alternatives
According to Elliot Millenson, President of Direct Access Diag-
nostics, manufacturers of the home-testing kits currently under devel-
opment "are empowering people who choose to get testing and
counseling in a setting that they are comfortable with .... providing
choice for people who are unwilling or unable to use current testing
alternatives."'' 55 Millenson identifies an important benefit to the ap-
proval of safe, effective HIV home-testing products-maintenance of
individual freedom and optimization of consumer choice. While this
consideration is more abstract than the other concerns discussed in
this Section, it is nonetheless a vitally important one. It is addressed
in greater detail in the more philosophical discussion of the appropri-
ate role and limits of FDA scrutiny contained in the following Section.
the three HIV home-testing products under consideration by the 1994 Panel range from
$30.00 to $50.00. See Deborah Potter, At Home HIV Testing Creates Renewed Controversy
(CNN cable broadcast, June 22,1994) (citing $30.00 price); see also Robert Trautman, FDA
Asked to Back Home-Testing for HIV, RnuTns, June 22, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Current News File (citing $50.00 price).
152. According to CDC audit figures, the AIDS testing program of Los Angeles
County, which received federal grant funds, spends between $77 and $300 per HIV test.
Hanna Rosin, Home Testing Kit For AIDS Not What Activists Ordered, RocKy MTN.
NEWS, June 22, 1994, at 41A.
153. See Cimons, supra note 132, at A10 (quoting C. Everett Koop, who stated that
home testing can increase the number of persons tested "without government budgets and
without government bureaucracies").
154. HIV testing at public cost, while desirable in the abstract, may not be the most
effective and efficient usage of dollars devoted to the curtailment and treatment of AIDS.
For an economic analysis of the costs of testing among different populations with different
infection prevalences, see Bruce D. McCarthy et al., Who Should Be Screened for HIV
Infection?; A Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 153 ARCH. ImRN. MED. 1107 (1993).
155. Hamil R. Harris, AIDS Activists Assail At-Home Testing, WAsH. PosT, Apr. 9,
1994, at G1.
January 1995] HIV HOME TESTING
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
IV. Home Testing and the Role of the FDA
The considerations the FDA entertains in determining whether a
medical device can be marketed within the United States are dis-
turbing.156 This Section contends that the FDA's focus should be
strictly limited to questions of a product's safety and effectiveness,
along primary standards rather than secondary criteria.157 When the
agency's evaluation exceeds primary analysis of safety and effective-
ness, it enters the realm of intolerable paternalism, 158 flouting values
of freedom and autonomy and raising yet again the specter of the reg-
ulatory agency as "national nanny,"' 59 empowered to protect us
against any weaknesses in ourselves. The discussion of advisable
scope of FDA inquiry is divided into three Subsections: (A) Regula-
tory History and Background; (B) The Appropriate Sphere of FDA
Evaluation: Legislative and Regulatory Bases Supporting FDA Re-
straint; and (C) The Appropriate Scope of FDA Evaluation: Philo-
sophical Bases Supporting FDA Restraint.
A. Regulatory History and Background
Via periodic legislation throughout the twentieth century, Con-
gress has gradually conferred upon the FDA increasing authority to
monitor pharmaceutical products and medical devices for effective-
ness and safety. Under the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, manu-
facturers were required to monitor drugs for strength, quality, and
purity, as well as to provide accurate and complete labeling of con-
156. For discussion of some of these extraneous considerations, see generally supra
Section III.
157. This is not to suggest that the FDA's activities within this more limited sphere of
authority have always been adequately constrained. To the contrary, despite recent im-
provements that have been instituted largely in response to pressures of AIDS activists, the
FDA has often been excessively conservative and cautious in the execution of duties re-
lated to monitoring safety and effectiveness of drugs. See Steven R. Salbu, Regulation of
Drug Treatments for HIV and AIDS: A Contractarian Model of Access, 11 YALE J. ON
REG. 401 (1994).
158. Peter Huber of the Manhattan Institute goes so far as to call the FDA blanket ban
"murderously paternalistic." See Peter Huber, Blood Tests, FORBES, Aug. 1, 1994, at 97
("The very thought that we should limit when and how people learn vitally important
things about their own health, just because they might otherwise rush to the arms of Dr.
Kevorkian, seems murderously paternalistic.").
159. The specter of a "national nanny" engaged in overprotective regulatory activity is
an image originally evoked in a Washington Post article in response to children's advertis-
ing proposals and elaborated upon by Michael Pertschuk. See MICHAEL PERTSCHUK, RE-
VOLT AGAINST REGULATION: THE RISE AND PAUSE OF THE CONSUMER MOVEMENT 69-
117 (1982).
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tents.16° Following the tragedy of Elixir Sulfanilamide, a product that
resulted in more than 100 deaths, 161 Congress passed the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938.162 The Act required safety
testing and government approval prior to the marketing of new phar-
maceutical products. 63 The drug testing scheme presently in place
was developed in 1962, in response to the large incidence of birth de-
fects related to the use of thalidomide by pregnant women. 64 Regula-
tion adopted pursuant to the Kefauver-Harris Amendments of 1962165
required a series of phases of clinical testing prior to the submission of
a new drug application. 66
Prior to 1976, the FDA's jurisdiction over medical devices was
limited to policing misbranding and adulteration. 67 This degree of
authority resembled the weak government control over drug products
that existed prior to the reforms of 1938. Before Congress addressed
the lack of regulatory premarketing control over medical devices, the
FDA gained some control over such devices by classifying them as
new drugs.16 Nonetheless, regulatory authority over the marketing of
medical devices remained weak in the absence of legislation tailored
to cover such products. 169 In the late 1960s the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare began to study the problems associated with
this regulatory gap, culminating in the Cooper Committee reports, the
160. Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3915, §§ 1-12, 34 Stat. 768-72.
161. Arthur H. Hayes, Food and Drug Regulation After 75 Years, 246 JAMA 1223,
1224 (1981); David F. Cavers, Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938: Its Legislative History
and Its Substantive Provisions, 6 LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoBs. 2, 20 (1939).
162. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 52-717, 52 Stat. 1040
(1938) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1988)).
163. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, ch. 675, § 505,52 Stat. 1040, 1052-
53.
164. See Views of Senators Estes Kafauver, John A. Carroll, Thomas J. Dodd, Philip A.
Hart, and Edward V. Long, S. REP. No. 1744,87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), reprinted in 1962
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2884,2898,2905-07 (discussing the problem of thalidomide in the context of
the 1962 Amendments).
165. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781,76 Stat. 780 (codified in scattered
sections of 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-81 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
166. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (1987).
167. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 U.S.C. §§ 3551-52 (1988).
168. See United States v. Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784 (1969) (holding that an Antibi-
otic Sensitivity disc was a "drug" within the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and
therefore subject to FDA premarket clearance).
169. For a discussion of the motivation behind the 1976 legislation regarding medical
devices, see H.R. REP. No. 853, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-12 (1976).
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recommendations of which served as the foundation for legislative
reform. 1
70
Ultimately, the legislation that strengthened FDA authority over
medical devices was hastened by yet another tragedy. In the wake of
deaths related to the Dalkon Shield intrauterine contraceptive device
and the recall of 23,000 pacemakers in the 1970s,171 Congress enacted
the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (1976 Amendments),
72
subjecting medical devices to premarketing FDA approval require-
ments analogous to existing premarketing drug approval laws. 73 The
1976 Amendments were refined by the Safe Medical Devices Act of
1990 (1990 Act). 74 Pursuant to its authority under the medical de-
vices legislation, the FDA established a postmarketing reporting sys-
tem, which requires manufacturers of approved devices to disclose
faults and malfunctions of which they become aware, to supplement
premarketing control.175
The kind of "device" covered by the 1976 Amendments is defined
as "an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, im-
plant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article, including any
component, part, or accessory, which is... [inter alia] intended for use
in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitiga-
tion, treatment, or prevention of disease .... ,,176 Home-testing kits
170. For a discussion of the Cooper Committee, see Theodore Cooper, Device Legisla-
tion, 26 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 165, 171 (1971).
171. See 122 CONG. REc. 5850 (1976) (statement of Rep. Rogers); 121 CONG. REc.
10,693 (1975) (statement of Sen. Ribicoff).
172. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 295, 90 Stat. 539 (codified at 21
U.S.C. §§ 360c-360k (1988)).
173. Under FDA implementation of the 1976 Amendments, devices marketed before
May 28, 1976, or that are substantially equivalent to devices that were marketed in inter-
state commerce before May 28, 1976, are exempt from the premarket approval require-
ment. Instead, marketing such "substantial equivalents" requires FDA notification under
§ 510(k) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938. See 21 C.F.R. § 814.1(c)(1)
(1993); THE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON
ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 98TH CONG., 1ST SESS., MEDICAL DEVICE REGULATION: THE
FDA's NEGLEC-ED CHILD 2 (Comm. Print 1983).
The loophole for devices marketed before 1976 and their substantial equivalents has
been heavily criticized for providing many device manufacturers with a method of evading
the public scrutiny intended to be established by the 1976 Amendments. See U.S. GEN.
Accr. OFF., MEDICAL DEVICES: FDA'S 510(K) OPERATIONS COULD BE IMPROVED
(1988).
174. Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, 104 Stat. 4511 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. §§301-360).
175. 21 C.F.R. § 803.1 (1992).
176. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (1988).
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are subject to FDA jurisdiction, falling within its premarketing ap-
proval authority over in vitro diagnostic devices.177
Under the 1976 Amendments and the 1990 Act, medical devices
may fall within three categories or "classes."178 Class I devices pres-
ent relatively low-level risks179 and are therefore subjected only to
general rather than device-specific controls, which provide standards
of production, marketing, labeling, and record-keeping.180 Manufac-
turers of Class I devices register the devices with the FDA through a
notification process; these devices do not require premarketing ap-
proval. 13s Class II devices are considered riskier,as and are therefore
subject to either performance standards specifically tailored to each
particular device, or special controls'8 3 as the FDA deems necessary
on an ad hoc basis.184 Class Ill devices are those for which the FDA
deems premarketing approval of safety and effectiveness necessary. 85
177. The FDA defines "in vitro" devices as "reagents, instruments, and systems in-
tended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, including a determination of
the state of health, in order to cure, mitigate, treat, or prevent disease or its sequalae." 21
C.F.R § 809.3(a) (1992).
178. The FDA is charged with the responsibility for classifying all types of devices. 21
U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). For a discussion of the classification scheme
of the Medical Device Amendments, see Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. FDA, 589 F.2d 1175,
1177 (2d Cir. 1978).
179. A Class I device is one that "is not purported or represented to be for a use in
supporting or sustaining human life or for a use which is of substantial importance in
preventing impairment of human health, and ... does not present a potential unreasonable
risk of illness of injury." 21 U.S.C. § 360(c)(a)(1)(A)(ii)(I-D) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
180. 21 U.S.C. §§ 352, 360(c) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
181. 1d. § 360(c)(0.
182. A Class II device "cannot be classified as a class I device because the general
controls by themselves are insufficient to provide reasonable assurance of the safety and
effectiveness of the device .... ." 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
183. "Special controls" is the Class II mechanism provided in the 1990 Act. Special
controls can also include "postmarket surveillance, patient registries, development and dis-
semination of guidelines .. ., recommendations, and other appropriate actions .... ." Id
184. The 1976 Amendments originally contemplated FDA explication of precise per-
formance standards for each Class II device. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B) (1988), amended by
21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1992)). The 1990 Act liberalized this expectation to
the more emergent process of ad hoc Class I special controls in deference to the fact that
the FDA did not establish precise performance standards for most Class II devices as con-
ceived under the 1976 Amendments. Id. For discussion of the evolution of Class II scru-
tiny from 1976 through 1990, see Lawrence S. Makow, Medical Device Review at the Food
and Drug Administration: Lessons from Magnetic Resonance Spectroscopy and Biliary Li-
thotripsy, 46 STAN. L. Rnv. 709, 713-15 (1994).
185. Specifically, Class I designation applies to any device that "cannot be classified
as a class I device because insufficient information exists to determine that the application
of general controls are sufficient to provide reasonable assurance of the safety and effec-
tiveness of the device, and ... cannot be classified as a class II device because insufficient
information exists to determine that the special controls [that apply to class II] ... would
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A medical device is labelled as Class III if it is "[life-]supporting or
[life-]sustaining... or for a use which is of substantial importance in
preventing impairment of human health, or [if the device] presents a
potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury.1 86 New devices are
presumed to be Class III devices, requiring premarketing approval,
subject to reassessment that can be triggered by a sponsor's request
that a new device be reclassified.187
The first level of scrutiny for Class III applications is the domin-
ion of FDA advisory panels,188 the proceedings of which are public8 9
and the membership of which includes national experts having no for-
mal association with the FDA. 190 The recommendations of advisory
panels are not binding on the FDA, but are generally considered to be
highly persuasive.' 9' Congress has stipulated that effectiveness of
Class III devices be demonstrated "on the basis of well-controlled in-
vestigations, including clinical investigations where appropriate, by ex-
perts qualified by training and experience to evaluate the effectiveness
of the device .... , 192 Congress has not, to date, established any anal-
ogously specific standards for establishing product safety.193  As
noted earlier, HIV home-testing products are considered Class III de-
vices 194 and are subject to premarketing approval under the FDA's
most rigorous standards of medical device control.
provide reasonable assurance of its safety and effectiveness, and.., is purported or repre-
sented to be for a use in supporting or sustaining human life or for a use which is of
substantial importance in preventing impairment of human health, or... presents a poten-
tial unreasonable risk of illness or injury." 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C) (1988 & Supp. IV
1992).
186. 21 C.F.R. § 860.3(c)(2) (1993).
187. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360(c)(f)(1), 360(e)(a)(2) (1988).
188. 21 U.S.C. § 360(e)(c)(2) (1988).
189. See H.R. REP. No. 853, supra note 169, at 39 ("To encourage thorough and scien-
tific evaluation on the parts of the panels as well as to facilitate review by the Secretary and
oversight activities by the Congress and the general public, the proposed legislation re-
quires each panel to maintain a transcript of its proceedings ....").
190. Id. (suggesting that the 1976 Amendments "require[ ] the Secretary to establish
panels of experts, organized according to medical and scientific specialties, to review
medical
devices ... .
191. Robert B. Leflar, Public Accountability and Medical Device Regulation, 2 HARV.
J.L. & TEcH. 1, 11-12 (1989).
192. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C)(3) (1988).
193. Makow, supra note 184, at 716.
194. See Kathi Gannon, AIDS Home Test Kits: Concern for Safety Gives Rise to Cau-
tion, 123 DRUG Topics, Apr. 23, 1990, at 28 (reporting the FDA Center for Biologics'
designation of "collection kits," composed of "a skin disinfectant, lancet, collection tube,
bandage, instruction booklet, mailing package, and coding system for identification," as
Class III medical devices).
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B. The Appropriate Scope of FDA Evaluation: Legislative and
Regulatory Bases Supporting FDA Restraint
The legislative and regulatory environment in the era of AIDS
suggests that the FDA should exercise self-restraint rather than self-
indulgence in defining standards for the assessment of HIV home-test-
ing products. To examine this proposition, it is necessary to discuss
briefly the concept of administrative discretion under federal law.
This discussion will be followed by an analysis of the nature of the
scope of congressional and FDA evaluation in the era of AIDS.
Like other federal administrative agencies, the FDA has been
delegated a substantial degree of discretion in the achievement of con-
gressionally authorized goals. Under the Administrative Procedures
Act (APA), the actions of federal agencies in the implementation of
congressional charges are considered discretionary and therefore
outside the scope of judicial review under either of two conditions: if
judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute or if discretion is ex-
pressly accorded to particular spheres of action by statute.195 How-
ever, the discretion accorded to administrative agencies under the
APA is not limitless. Agency acts and decisions can be adjudicated to
be unlawful and invalid when, inter alia, they are "arbitrary, capri-
cious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law.'
96
The congressional conferral of agency discretion in the imple-
mentation of its mandates, combined with the provision for court de-
terminations of abuse of discretion, suggest that discretion is
ultimately limited. Administrative agencies are given a broad rein in
achieving the ends for which they have been established; nonetheless,
their acts and decisions can be restrained if they are unrelated to the
goals and objectives of the relevant enabling statutes. 97 As one com-
mentator has summarized, "Congress sets... limits by mandating the
FDA's goals. Agency decisions, therefore, must be based on factors
designed to further such goals.' 98
Courts have recognized that the distinction between unreview-
able discretion and reviewable abuse of discretion exists on a slippery
195. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1988).
196. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988).
197. Vigil v. Rhoades, 746 F. Supp. 1471, 1478 (D.N.M. 1990), affd, 953 F.2d 1225 (5th
Cir.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 50 (1992).
198. Debora C. Fliegelman, Comment, The FDA and RU486: Are Politics Compatible
with the FDA's Mandate of Protecting Public Health and Safety?, 66 T mP. L. REv. 143,
150-51 (1993).
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slope.199 Nonetheless, a general rule of thumb has emerged: While
agency action may be reviewed and invalidated for exceeding the rea-
sonable sphere of its authority under congressional mandate, courts
should not overturn agency decisions simply because they disagree
with the wisdom of those decisions.200 From this perspective, the cru-
cial question regarding the scrutiny of administrative action becomes
whether the agency has exceeded the reasonable bounds of its author-
ity. Under the holding of Chevron v. NRDC, congressional mandates
to agencies are interpreted by analysis of specific statutory language
or by reasonable agency construction of general statutory language.201
Again, this approach reaffirms Congress's conferral of substantial, but
not limitless discretion to administrative agencies, which interpret and
execute their statutory charges.
Within this framework, one can examine Congress's charge to the
FDA regarding the safety and effectiveness of medical devices in gen-
eral, as well as medical devices associated exclusively with HIV and
AIDS. The legislative history of the 1976 Amendments reveals an in-
tent to authorize what one representative called "the least regulation
necessary to assure safety and effectiveness.., applied to devices." 2°2
This charge arguably acts as an express congressional constraint upon
unfettered agency discretion in the implementation of the
Amendments.
Even if the agency has a wide berth of discretion, Congress has
narrowly defined the realm within which that discretion can be exer-
cised legitimately. FDA authority over diagnostic home-testing de-
vices was intended to pertain strictly to "the medical danger such
articles present by inducing consumers into a dangerous medical reli-
ance," 20 3 as when inaccurate home pregnancy results cause recipients
of false negatives to continue smoking or drinking, or recipients of
false positives to abstain from seeking medical treatment for unde-
tected pathological conditions.204 This authority assures the public
that a product is safe for use and that the product is sufficiently effec-
199. For an example of the difficulties courts face in reconciling the concepts of discre-
tion and abuse of discretion under the APA, see Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
200. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
201. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
202. Gary E. Gamerman, Note, Intended Use and Medical Devices: Distinguishing
Nonmedical "Devices" from Medical "Devices" Under 21 U.S.C. 321(h), 61 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 822 n.99 (1993) (quoting Rep. Rogers, 122 CONG. REc. 13,778 (1976)).
203. Id. at 823.
204. Id. at 823 n.109.
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tive20 5 to mitigate an unacceptable risk of harmful, medical treatment-
related behaviors or omissions that would result from false diagno-
ses.206 Even granting the FDA broad discretion in ensuring the pri-
mary safety and effectiveness of a medical device, actions that address
secondary ripple effects of primarily safe products appear to be
outside the bounds that Congress intended to set.
Likewise, the other reforms discussed in Subsection (A), those
generally applicable, rather than specifically applicable, to HIV home-
testing products focus the FDA's premarketing approval authority ex-
clusively on monitoring primary product safety and effectiveness. 20 7
They do not create a regulatory license to protect the public beyond
these two realms. Moreover, recent alterations of general FDA pol-
icy, many of which have been implemented in response to AIDS and
AIDS activism,2 08 reflect restraint rather than indulgence of the
FDA's protective role.20 9
For example, in 1987, the FDA authorized physician prescription
of certain experimental drugs as "treatment investigational new
drugs" (treatment INDs) for the treatment of "serious or immediately
life-threatening disease" for which there is no "satisfactory alternative
or other drug therapy available,' 210 provided that clinical investiga-
tions have begun and the manufacturer is seeking marketing approval
with due diligence. Similarly, the FDA adopted "fast-track" approval
procedures211 in 1988, under which treatments for life-threatening and
severely debilitating diseases can be approved prior to the third phase
of clinical testing that is ordinarily required under the 1962 Amend-
ments 2 12 By 1992 a Public Health Service Policy Statement estab-
205. In regard to diagnostic devices, effectiveness refers to a test's reliability in deliver-
ing accurate diagnostic results.
206. Here, it is important to distinguish between dangers associated with behaviors
actuated by false diagnostic information and the risk that is purported to pertain to H1V
home testing. Critics of HIV home-testing products who are concerned about potentially
suicidal recipients of positive test results in the absence of counseling are not concerned
with the ramifications of ineffective products-i.Le, false positives and false negatives-but
rather with the ramifications of an effective product.
207. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C) (1988).
208. Se ag., U.S. Food and Drug Administration and AIDS Drugs, NEw REPUBLIC,
Oct. 17, 1994 (attributing accelerated approval of AIDS drugs to activist demands).
209. For detailed discussion of recent instances of FDA regulatory restraint regarding
AIDS treatments, see Salbu, supra note 157.
210. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(c)(1)(i)-(iv) (1987).
211. Investigational New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations;
Procedures for Drugs Intended to Treat Life-Threatening and Debilitating Diseases, 53
Fed. Reg. 41,515 (1988) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 312, 314 (1988)).
212. 21 C.F.R. § 312.34(a) (1988).
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lished a "parallel track" mechanism, whereby access to experimental
HIV/AIDS drugs has been expanded to permit parallel track studies
that operate as a complement to traditional clinical investigation, 13
but without the requirement of ordinary laboratory control.2 14 Fi-
nally, the FDA implemented a policy in 1992 that permitted market-
ing approval of new drugs for treatment of serious or life-threatening
diseases, the effectiveness of which is supported by "surrogate
marker" indices215-i.e., indices that show improvement in a marker
that is correlated with a clinical benefit rather than indices that di-
rectly indicate actual improvement in health.2 16
These reforms all move in the same direction-toward legislative
and regulatory restraint in deference to consumer autonomy, within
the bounds of ensuring primary product safety and effectiveness.
They indicate a trend toward restrained FDA scrutiny of AIDS-re-
lated products, in deference to countervailing consumer autonomy in-
terests. In the following Subsection, these interests are examined in
greater detail, placing the recent changes in legislative and regulatory
environment in philosophical context.
C. The Appropriate Scope of FDA Evaluation: Philosophical Bases
Supporting FDA Restraint
Suppose for a moment that the FDA has virtually limitless discre-
tion in evaluating medical device premarketing applications and that
all the arguments in Subsection (B) fail in deference to unrestricted
agency autonomy. Even given the most absurdly unfettered discretion
to push the boundaries of its mandates beyond recognition, the FDA
should concede excessive authority by exercising self-restraint. This
Subsection provides public policy arguments intended to persuade the
FDA and its public constituency that the agency should carefully limit
the data that it will admit into the relatively informal scope of its med-
ical device advisory panel hearings.
213. Expanded Availability of Investigational New Drugs Through a Parallel Track
Mechanism for People with AIDS and other HIV-Related Disease, 57 Fed. Reg. 13,250
(1992).
214. Id. at 13,256.
215. 21 C.F.R. § 314.510 (1993).
216. The FDA has defined a surrogate marker as a "laboratory measurement or physi-
cal sign that is used in therapeutic trials as a substitute for a clinically meaningful endpoint
that is a direct measure of how a patient feels, functions, or survives and that is expected to
predict the effect of ... therapy." 57 Fed. Reg. 13,234, 13,235 (1992).
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Specifically, the FDA should decline to consider evidence not rel-
evant to primary safety and effectiveness. 217 To understand why, let
us first examine the role of regulation in a free society. Regulation is
often necessary to protect consumers when we are unable to protect
ourselves.218 Companies may be able to hide product defects, given
disparities of size and power between corporations and individuals.
Corporations have access to laboratories, testing facilities, technolo-
gies, and information that are unavailable to the average consumer.
Indeed, erosion of the common law doctrine of caveat emptor evinces
this trend: Self-protective capabilities of buyers are impaired by more
sophisticated products, the strengths and weaknesses of which cannot
possibly be evaluated by mere inspection.219 Along this vein, the tech-
nological complexity of pharmaceutical products and medical devices,
combined with the unmanageable number of options available and the
fact that scientific and/or medical knowledge is necessary to assess
these options, are generally adequate justifications for FDA authority
to monitor product safety and effectiveness. 2
20
Sometimes, however, consumer protection extends beyond these
reasonable functions, yielding an overly protective, overly intrusive
regulatory mechanism.22 1 Arguments addressed in Section II, in sup-
port of a blanket ban on HIV home-testing products, suggest that such
products may be dangerous in light of consumers' inability to process
the information derived from their use without professional assist-
ance. There are no reasonable arguments suggesting that such prod-
ucts, as a class, are inherently or primarily dangerous, either by design
or by virtue of any technological complexity that might render non-
217. For a definition and discussion of primary and secondary safety and effectiveness,
see supra note 14; see also infra note 217.
218. David Bollier & Joan Claybrook, Regulations That Work, Tim WASHINGTON
MoNT-mY, Apr. 1986, at 47.
219. Accordingly, that common law doctrine has been undermined by the neoclassical
reforms contained in the Uniform Commercial Code, particularly through the develop-
ment of implied warranties. See U.C.C. §§ 2-314,2-315. Regulatory protection of consum-
ers developed parallel to contract reform, as social, economic, and technological
complexity provided manufacturers with new opportunities to dupe consumers and as
changes in social attitudes fostered the protective impulse.
220. While the complexity of pharmaceuticals may justify the FDA's general role in
assessing safety and effectiveness, it may not justify the FDA's traditionally conservative
posture and high approval standards or the long product-to-market time-frames that result.
Whether the FDA is reasonably cautious or overly cautious, in general and in specific ref-
erence to AIDS treatments, is a separate, debatable issue. For further discussion, see
Salbu, supra note 157.
221. See PERrSCHuK, supra note 159 (discussing proposed children's advertising bans
viewed by many as excessive).
January 1995] HI1V HOME TESTING
professional administration suspect.22 Rather, the critics' greatest
concern is that the knowledge of HIV status derived from these prod-
ucts may be psychologically threatening. FDA consideration of po-
tential emotional reactions to reliable information is inappropriate for
several reasons.
Most significantly, the posited danger of uncounseled consumer
reaction does not evoke the rationale that justifies regulatory protec-
tion-that the consumer cannot protect herself because of over-
whelming informational or power disparities that exist between
herself and the manufacturer. As noted earlier, opponents of home
testing base their opposition primarily upon two general concepts:
that home testing may not provide accurate results and that home
testing may fail to provide or require pre- and post-test counseling
opportunities in general, and in-person counseling opportunities in
specific. While the former concerns are legitimate effectiveness is-
sues,223 well within the range of traditional FDA concern, the latter
222. Critics of home testing do not suggest that home-testing products are unsafe in the
classic sense that unsafe drugs are rejected for marketing under FDA applications. The
tests themselves are not harmful. Home-testing kits do not evoke images of unsophistica-
ted consumers subject to deception or to unknown risks from which they must be protected
in complex markets in which many products of varying safety are sold. The kits are not
unsafe in themselves; instead, they purportedly have the potential to lead users to acts of
desperation in the face of psychologically devastating news.
223. In regard to both safety and effectiveness, home-testing products may in fact differ
from laboratory testing. Specifically, technology may not be developed sufficiently to per-
mit either safe or effective testing by nonprofessionals. For example, one British critic has
questioned the accuracy of home testing, particularly in light of the ongoing mutation of
the virus, such that antibodies to new strains may not be identified by tests developed prior
to a particular mutation. See Rogers, supra note 39 (quoting Stephen Coote, spokesperson
for England's National AIDS Trust). If the technology of any particular iteration of the
test is unlikely to give accurate readings within a reasonable time subsequent to purchase
of the product because of viral mutation, this is a legitimate effectiveness concern.
Whereas medical and laboratory professionals can maintain up-to-the-minute technology
and an awareness of the latest developments in HIV/AIDS viral strains, consumers have
no reasonable mechanism to achieve this result. Under legitimate FDA standards, the sale
of such products can reasonably be curtailed, but only if home-testing products are indeed
unavoidably resistant to accurate usage, and therefore to effective performance of the job
for which they are ostensibly created.
This condition of mutation-based inaccuracy is not at all a foregone conclusion. Effec-
tiveness problems associated with home-testing products that result from detection of an-
tibodies to new mutations will depend on the frequency of mutation, the actual elusiveness
of mutations from detection under extant tests, and a finding that solutions to these diffi-
culties such as product usage dating cannot effectively handle the problem. Even in light of
the worst possible evidence regarding product effectiveness in detecting antibodies to fre-
quently arising viral mutations, companies may be able to develop products that can match
laboratory effectiveness. For example, follow-up tests could be mailed to any consumer
immediately and automatically upon receipt of telephone results. With express mail op-
tions, such a program would be at no disadvantage in comparison to laboratory testing in
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concerns do not evoke the kind of safety issues that fall within justifi-
able FDA purview.
Issues surrounding consumer reaction to home test telephone di-
agnoses concern the prudence of individual purchasers. In the late
1980s one writer acknowledged that while the technology for HIV
home testing was ready, a question remained, "[I]s its use pru-
dent?"224 This is surely a crucial question, given the devastation that
can accompany the information provided by the kits. But whose cru-
cial question is it? Should judgments regarding the prudence of using
high-quality HIV home-testing products be made by the government
or by individuals? A government agency that mandates its official
version of prudence by regulatory fiat evokes the image of the na-
tional nanny,225 whose presence can only be justified when its wards
are incapable of exercising prudence for themselves. Truly free adults
employ their own judgment in making prudent decisions, particularly
when the information needed to process the decision is neither highly
technical nor overly complex.
226
Examining HIV home testing under these principles, the FDA
should change its policy prohibiting the sale of primarily safe and ef-
fective227 HIV home-testing kits. The risks of home-testing products
that serve their diagnostic function effectively-i.e., the absence of
its ability to maintain currency. Such an option would of course reduce the market for
home test products by burdening their convenience, which presumably would be a selling
point for some customers. This problem would be a marketing problem for manufacturers,
but not a legitimate concern for the FDA. As long as the product is safe and effective
when used in accordance with instructions, it should pass FDA muster. While technologi-
cal sophistication of the product may disqualify it from safe and effective usage by nonpro-
fessional consumers, relatively simple and straightforward instructions accessible to
laypersons can mitigate grounds for disapproval.
224. The Compleat Hypocondriac, EcoNoMIsT, May 6, 1989, at 79.
225. For reference to the original criticism of regulatory activism as the apparition of a
"national nanny," see supra note 159.
226. Consumers do not need protection against products that are themselves safe, but
the use of which may cause an obvious, reasonably foreseeable element of psychological
trauma. To protect consumers from these kinds of risks is fundamentally different from the
more common protections afforded by the FDA. Whereas the agency ordinarily and justi-
fiably rejects inherently dangerous drugs and devices, the dangers of which consumers
could not reasonably expect to discover themselves, rejection of inherently safe home-
testing kits supplants the individual's own consumption decision with a centralized govern-
mental policy. Such behavior violates a basic tenet of a free society: Personal decisions,
even (and especially) controversial or risky decisions, should vest whenever possible in the
individual rather than in government or society. For further elaboration of this principle,
see Steven R. Salbu, Law and Conformity, Ethics and Conflict The Trouble with Law-
Based Conceptions of Ethics, 68 IND. L.J. 101 (1992).
227. At this juncture, it is helpful to explicate more fully the concepts of "primary" and
"secondary" safety and effectiveness, which were briefly defined earlier. See supra note 14.
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face-to-face counseling opportunities and susceptibility to suicidal im-
pulses-are secondary rather than primary risks. In other words, they
are risks associated with reactions to the safe use of an effective prod-
uct rather than risks associated immediately and directly with a prod-
uct that in itself is ineffective or unsafe.
22
To this point, the discussion has remained theoretical, yet the
FDA's abrogation of personal freedom through implementation of the
blanket ban has had practical ramifications as well. FDA rejection of
home-testing kits for ostensible safety reasons denies the great major-
ity of individuals access to a potentially useful and even lifesaving
choice in order to protect the lowest common denominator of con-
sumers. For the majority of consumers capable of making their own
informed decisions, denial of access to home-testing products may re-
sult in failure to receive medical treatment as well as inadvertent in-
fection of others.
Even if the FDA ultimately approves the marketing of home-test-
ing products, its very examination of the psychological effects of these
The FDA's refusal to approve home-testing products in 1990 appears to be a function,
at least in part, of a conception of "effectiveness" that is more expansive than that pro-
posed in these paragraphs. A statement made by one FDA spokesperson is suggestive of
the breadth with which the present administration perceives its mission: "FDA believes
that appropriate patient counseling and medical referrals are key components to any effec-
tive HIV-testing program." Hamil R. Harris, AIDS Activists Reject At-Home Testing,
WASH. PosT, Apr. 9, 1994, at G1 (quoting FDA spokesperson Arthur Whitmore). This
statement suggests that the FDA sees its role in assessing effectiveness as surpassing the
mere evaluation of whether a product successfully achieves its immediate ends; instead,
FDA effectiveness extends as well to the exercise of judgment regarding consequences that
go beyond effectiveness of the product's immediate task.
The distinction between a product's "immediate effectiveness" and its "consequential
effectiveness" is not spurious. Immediate effectiveness refers here to the ability of a prod-
uct to achieve desirable medical or diagnostic results. Consequential effectiveness entails a
judgment regarding more remote repercussions of product usage-repercussions that ex-
tend beyond medical or diagnostic efficacy. Application of a standard of consequential
effectiveness permits the FDA to evaluate, inter alia, whether or not consumers should be
trusted to make informed and responsible decisions regarding the use of a product, even if
its immediate medical or diagnostic effectiveness is not at issue. My use of the term "pri-
mary" in regard to safety and effectiveness refers to immediate safety and effectiveness; my
use of the term "secondary" in regard to safety and effectiveness refers to consequential
safety and effectiveness.
228. The risk denoted is not a scientifically sophisticated or technical risk from which
the government must protect the lay consumer because of lack of specialized information.
Instead, the risks reflect basic vulnerability, the understanding of which is extremely acces-
sible to all who are tested for HIV, regardless of the circumstances. Moreover, the vulner-
ability of those tested is obvious to any consumer exercising a modicum of common sense.
In deference to any scarcity of common sense, warnings can be utilized in order to protect
those who lack either the information or the judgment required to recognize their vulnera-
bility upon receiving notification of seropositivity.
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products upon consumers is an abuse of power. The FDA should limit
its role to that for which it was historically created-to protect the
public from the sale of inherently unsafe and ineffective products.
Specifically, the FDA should refuse to consider whether consumers
should be allowed to purchase primarily safe and effective products,
simply because critics have suggested that some consumers may be
unequipped to process the knowledge that is made available by those
products. The government should not determine the conditions under
which we can be trusted to process information regarding our own
health.229
229. The executive editor of Poz, a magazine aimed at HIV-positive individuals and
others interested in AIDS and HIV, accurately identifies the issue of home testing as the
right to information rather than consumer protection against safe or ineffective products.
Accordingly, in support of home testing, he has observed, "I reject the notion that I can
only get the information [contained in HIV test results] when my doctor or some govern-
ment agency says I can have it." See Rogers, supra note 39 (quoting Sean O'Brien Staub,
Executive Editor of Poz, who also contends that home-testing products should provide pre-
and post-testing access to psychological support).
From a slightly different perspective, the issue of home-testing approval is one of the
degree of government coercion that is acceptable in our society. When critics suggest that'
home testing should be rejected because counseling is a necessary adjunct to any safe and
effective testing program, they suggest that no one should be permitted to know her HIV
status without agreeing to subject herself to counseling. Individuals in a free society should
reject any coerced imposition of counseling. Mandatory counseling, associated with re-
ceipt of HIV test results, infringes on the individual's privacy. Some people have stronger
faith in the value of counseling than others; some people are suspicious of the training and
abilities of strangers, and prefer to direct their own development. When regulatory poli-
cies couple our access to crucial information about ourselves to a counseling requirement,
they effectively mandate counseling as a condition to receiving that information. Two
classes of egregious results will obtain-:some persons will forfeit their privacy and subject
themselves to unwanted counseling because they perceive the importance of knowing their
HIV status to exceed their autonomy in avoiding professional counseling; others who find
the counseling requirement sufficiently repugnant will simply choose not to be tested at all.
Neither of these results should be considered acceptable to free persons living in an osten-
sibly free society. Accordingly, the FDA should decline to exercise its power by "encour-
aging" (read "requiring") those who are HIV tested to receive professional guidance.
The function of assessing consequential effectiveness is a vital one, but it is preferably
an individual decision and not a government decision. See generally, Home HIV Tests
Merit FDA OK, CH. SuN-TImms, June 24, 1994, at 35 (comparing at-home testing to other
home tests, such as pregnancy tests). It is an individual decision because it ultimately re-
lates to consumption options that will vary according to personal utility preferences. As
long as the consequences are generally accessible to the public and not so abstract as to fall
beyond the grasp of consumers, the government should defer discretion to individual deci-
sion makers. The mission of the FDA, as it is generally understood, is to protect consum-
ers from products, the use of which would cause some physiological harm. The agency's
mission is not to protect us from ourselves, our bad judgment, or our conceptions of our
own independence and strength. Nor is the FDA's mission to protect those of us who don't
need protection. Persons who are self-aware and capable of correctly assessing their ability
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Conclusion
When the FDA decided in 1994 to reconsider its position on HIV
home-testing products, Deputy Commissioner for Food and Drugs
Mary Pendergast suggested that reconsideration was due because
"much has changed. ' 230 Indeed, by 1993, the Centers for Disease
Control increased their estimates of existing cases of HIV infection,231
and AIDS became the leading cause of death among persons aged 25-
44 in many cities.232 Yet while some changes have occurred since the
disease first appeared in the 1980s, many aspects of AIDS have re-
mained frustratingly stable. As the numbers of new cases steadily in-
crease, the search for a vaccine, a cure, or an effective treatment has
proven consistently elusive.233 The intransigence of AIDS, incurable
since it was first recognized nearly 15 years ago, has not changed. We
have known since the 1980s that avoidance of new infection is the only
method presently available to stem the ever-increasing tide of deaths.
From this standpoint, the purported "changes" that merit FDA recon-
sideration of its earlier stand against HIV home-testing products seem
illusory. The inexorable progress of the disease has been manifest for
years.
Another possible change since the late 1980s may account for the
FDA's sudden receptiveness to the consideration of home-testing
products-the fact that such products are likely to have improved in
both safety and effectiveness since their earlier conceptions. Sponsors
of home-testing products have continued to develop those products
despite the FDA's blanket ban. It is reasonable to assume that they
have achieved at least a modicum of technological improvement or
advancement. Yet this assumption is inadequate to explain the FDA's
blanket refusal to consider HIV home-testing products over a five-
year period. The manufacturers that wanted premarketing approval
during the ban believed that the products were safe and effective, yet
they were denied the opportunity to provide evidence to support their
to process their own emotions should resent any FDA intrusion that might reduce their
ability to exercise their freedoms responsibly.
230. See Warren E. Leary, Government Panel Hears Call for Expanded AIDS Testing,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 23, 1994, at A18.
231. Amanda Husted, CDC: 330,000 Americans Will Die from AIDS by 1995, AnL.
CONST., Jan. 15, 1993, at D3.
232. See Richard M. Selik et al., HIV Infection as Leading Cause of Death Among
Young Adults in US Cities and States, 270 JAMA 2991, 2991 (1993).
233. Susan K. Miller, Too Early for Vaccine Trials Say AIDS Experts, 142 NEw SCIEN-
nsT, June 25, 1994, at 6; Editorial, AIDS Vaccine: Hope and Dispair, 336 THE LANCET,
Dec. 22-29, 1990, at 1545.
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beliefs. The blanket ban implied that the FDA's foremost concern
regarding HIV home-testing products was not primary safety and ef-
fectiveness. The products were considered unacceptable in principle,
based on the social considerations that have been cited throughout
this Article and highlighted in Section II.
If the inexorable progress of AIDS has not changed since the late
1980s and if technological advancements in safety and effectiveness
must be discounted as factors by virtue of the FDA's refusal to con-
sider them at all during the period of the ban, then the ostensible
changes that justify reconsideration are elusive and unconvincing.
The most believable change is a change in the political climate: as
noted earlier, many commentators now clamor with increased fervor
for approval of HIV home-testing products, primarily to stem the fur-
ther spread of HIV and AIDS. The change that most likely spurred
FDA reconsideration is an increase in public pressure based on
changes in public opinion. From this perspective, Pendergast's impli-
cation that home-testing products as a class were inappropriate in the
late 1980s, but are suddenly appropriate in the 1990s, appears either
naive or disingenuous. The agency's imminent change of heart more
likely reflects a concomitant surge in the expression of public opinion.
While I am surely not the first commentator to recognize the ob-
vious, and indeed somewhat unavoidable, political susceptibility of the
FDA, 34 there is a crucial point here-home-testing products that
might conceivably be shown to be safe and effective under primary
standards were as desirable five years ago as they are today. Accord-
ingly, given the balance of arguments assessed in Sections II and III, it
is reasonable to suggest that the FDA's blanket ban on such products
during the past five years has been a policy error. The potential for
product flaws, enumerated in Section II, was no more compelling in
1988 than in 1994. Likewise, the reasons to encourage rather than
discourage the development and marketing of HIV home-testing
products, outlined in Section IH, have been valid since the first HIV-
testing technologies were developed. Unfortunately, it is reasonable
to assume that the FDA's disfavor of FHV home-testing products ac-
ted as a disincentive for companies to continue engaging in research
and development in this area. The FDA policy was not only as inad-
visable then as it is now; it may also have had a chilling effect on the
234. For discussion of the political sensitivity of the HIV home testing question for
FDA officials, see Graeme Browning, A Bold Step into the AIDS Debate, NAT'L L.J., Sept.
3, 1994, at 2053.
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most rapid development and improvement of HIV home-testing
technologies. 235
While the FDA appears likely to change its policy, thereby miti-
gating the effects of past policy,236 a question remains: Should the
FDA ever have allowed itself to address the kinds of policy considera-
tions that it considered, both in the late 1980s and in 1994? This Arti-
cle has suggested that the FDA should carefully limit the standards it
applies in both the establishment of broad policy and the assessment
of individual medical device applications.2 37 Specifically, the FDA
should limit its scrutiny to the product's primary safety and effective-
ness-i.e., it should consider only evidence that sheds light on whether
the product is made so that consumers can use it without unreasona-
ble risk of injury from the product itself and whether the product
achieves its purported purposes within reasonable effectiveness
parameters.
Under this standard, it is appropriate for the FDA to assess evi-
dence regarding the accuracy of home-testing products relative to on-
site products. It is also reasonable for the FDA to consider such fac-
tors as laypersons' capacity to handle the technology involved, the ef-
fects of the use of mail to convey samples, the ability to date the
products in order to maintain accuracy in light of viral mutations, and
any attendant diminution of overall accuracy of results given the bal-
ance of considerations. In regard to diagnostic devices specifically, ef-
fectiveness of home products is immediately and inextricably linked to
the ability of consumers to understand or interpret the results. If a
product is so technologically complex as to render diagnosis beyond
the grasp of laypersons, then it is not an effective home diagnosis
product. Likewise, the FDA should certainly assess any safety risks
that are associated with the immediate use of the product itself, such
as any risks of infection or excessive bleeding that may result from
self-administration of blood-prick tests.
However, the FDA should not assess evidence that is not relevant
to the evaluation of the primary safety and effectiveness of a medical
235. While this chilling effect is speculative, its existence is nonetheless logical: The
ban on home test products has served as a disincentive to develop such products for which
there has been no approved market.
236. The agency can only mitigate these effects. Because past policy postponed the use
of home products, thereby hindering their development and early use, it cannot entirely
rectify the negative results of the earlier policy.
237. While this Article focuses specifically on the FDA's authority and discretion over
medical devices, my comments regarding the appropriate exercise of FDA restraint apply
equally to that agency's role in the evaluation of pharmaceutical products.
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device. This generalization is true even when the factors dismissed are
important ones, in which case they should and must be assessed, but at
the level of the individual and not by government agency. Accord-
ingly, it is inappropriate for the FDA to consider whether home test-
ing accounts for patient needs to consult professionals and receive
medical treatment or whether home testing reduces the likelihood
that recipients of positive results will receive effective counseling.
While the administration of both medical treatment and counseling
are of undeniable importance to persons with H[V, it is reasonable to
vest the responsibility for seeking and finding these services in the
hands of patients themselves. In a world without costs, the govern-
ment could assume responsibility for matching all people with the
services they need or want; in the real world, the price of assuring this
match by banning home-testing products is unacceptably high. In the
real world, assuring optimal treatment by limiting testing to on-site
locations means fewer people will be tested and treated, and more
people will be infected.
This Article has observed that FDA consideration of factors be-
yond primary safety and effectiveness indicia is unacceptable. Two
points bear elaboration here. First, these arguments are not couched
primarily in terms of congressional authority. This Article does not
suggest that the FDA has not been given by Congress substantial ad-
ministrative discretion in defining the comprehensiveness of its man-
date. Rather, this Article recommends that the agency exercise self-
restraint for both ethical and pragmatic policy reasons. The FDA has
an obligation to exercise its discretion without unjustified incursions
upon individual freedom; it also must recognize the political realities
in a world of continuous scrutiny. If the FDA fails to curtail its discre-
tion voluntarily, Congress may and should be called upon to limit the
FDA's mandate by statutory explication. Second, the call for FDA
restraint is made on two levels, both the policy level and the individual
application assessment level. This means that the FDA should never
have instituted a blanket ban on all HIV home-testing products. It
should have remained open to considering each new product for its
primary safety and effectiveness. Should the FDA alter its policy
under the present political climate and receive HIV home test applica-
tions more hospitably, these applications should be assessed strictly on
the basis of these same primary safety and effectiveness standards. By
voluntarily limiting its role according to these standards, the FDA can
achieve an optimal balance between the maintenance of public safety
and individual freedom.
January 1995] HIV HOME TESTING
An FDA policy to evaluate only primary safety and effectiveness
of products would go furthest toward protecting consumer freedom to
assess the nontechnical considerations with regard to the prospective
purchase and use of medical devices. This policy suggests that the
FDA should decline to consider customers' psychological ability to
process information regarding their own health. Under such an ap-
proach, consumers would be left to consider and assess the conditions
under which they choose to be tested and receive test results. In order
for such a process to work, both accurate labeling requirements and
disclosure requirements may be necessary to ensure that consumers
indeed have adequate information to make their own responsible
choices. This approach maximizes respect for consumer autonomy be-
cause it allows the informed customer to decide what she wants to
purchase. If a customer is counseling-averse and chooses to face the
challenges in her life independently, she can purchase a home-testing
product that does not provide the support of telephone counseling. In
a competitive market, at least some of the costs saved by omitting
such support services can be passed on by manufacturers to consum-
ers, in order to attract market share. The autonomous customer in a
free market is thereby permitted to allocate scarce resources to other
priorities and is not forced to spend them on services he or she does
not want to buy.
However rational such administrative restraint may be, few agen-
cies are likely to exercise it, and the FDA is certainly no exception.
Institutions formed to regulate will regulate. Therefore, I propose an
alternative, less sound in principle, but perhaps more feasible in prac-
tice-if the FDA must concern itself with the protection of humans
from their own emotions, it should do so without denying the market
a product as valuable as HIV home-testing kits. Any regulatory con-
straints the agency feels compelled to impose, above and beyond the
requirement of primary product safety and effectiveness, should not
go so far as the categorical rejection of the entire class of products.
Instead, the FDA can require manufacturers to provide accessible
counseling services to purchasers of home test kits, and include such
services within the price of the product. While such regulatory edict
overreaches by coercing customers to purchase counseling service op-
tions whether they want them or not, at least it does so without en-
tirely expunging an important product from the marketplace.
Ultimately, whatever concessions the FDA can make in favor of con-
sumer choice among nontechnical, accessible options will be a victory
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to consumers and nonconsumers alike, as we mitigate the spread of a
pernicious and deadly disease.

